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Editorial 
 
It is customary launching new journals by claiming to focus on a new sub-
disciplinary domain or to introduce a new approach to the analysis of a familiar 
field. With this journal we start a less ambitious but nonetheless innovative enter-
prise. Science Technology & Innovation Studies (STI Studies) is the first interna-
tionally oriented journal for the German speaking STI community and the col-
leagues working in European or international research and higher education or-
ganizations located in this area. It will fill the gap which has evolved after the 
“Jahrbuch Technik und Gesellschaft” ceased to appear once the tenth volume had 
been published in 1999. As the working language of STI Studies is English the 
journal will also help increase the visibility of theoretical discussions and research 
projects which emerge in the German speaking environment.  
The journal seeks analytical, theoretical and methodological articles that focus on 
the creation and use of scientific knowledge and its relation to society, on the de-
velopment of technology and its social impact and control, and on innovation in 
industry and in the public sector.  
STI Studies is a conventional scholarly journal as regards high quality standards 
and anonymous peer review. We invite and encourage paper submissions which 
are addressed to an international audience. Our ambition is to establish a reputa-
tion which attracts a worldwide readership. We hope that the – still somewhat 
unconventional – option to try and reach the readership via a free online journal 
will turn out to be the best way. 
STI Studies will be published bi-annually including special issues edited by guest 
editors. We invite all colleagues to submit manuscripts or proposals for special 
issues. The success of this journal is contingent on your initiative and support as 
authors, reviewers and guest-editors. We will be happy to assist and collaborate. 
 
Ingo Schulz-Schaeffer 
Raymund Werle 
Johannes Weyer 
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Abstract 
Due to the accelerated dynamics of scientific and technological modernisation over 
the last few decades, the sharp and unambiguous categorical distinction and sepa-
ration between "nature" and "society" that has been essential for the self-
perception of Western modernity is increasingly subject to erosion or even dissolu-
tion. The article aims to explore the possible consequences of this blurring of 
boundaries with regard to the generation, social perception, and justification of 
social inequalities in "reflexive modern" societies. Using the examples of cosmetic 
surgery and predictive genetic testing, current tendencies of a seemingly paradoxi-
cal "renaturalisation" of inequality are outlined: contrary as well as parallel to the 
modern programme and promise of a "denaturalisation of society" (Jürgen Haber-
mas), "natural" characteristics such as physical appearance or genetic constitution 
are gaining importance in terms of social distinction and discrimination. One 
should, however, not fail to see that this renaturalisation is not simply a revival of 
older (if by no means definitely overcome) forms of social inequalities based on 
(presumedly) natural collective categories (sex, race, ethnicity and so on). Rather, a 
hybrid, scientifically and technically manufactured human "nature" becomes a me-
dium of novel forms of "individualised" discrimination: physical characteristics are 
no longer ascribed to certain groups or people as their inalterable natural qualities, 
but are increasingly conceived of as open to fashioning and therefore as socially 
achieved by the individual person. For this reason, the new inequalities "beyond" 
the modern nature-society divide are apparently not considered fundamentally 
illegitimate or "pre-modern". What seems to be needed in present-day societies is 
the establishment of new, socially accepted regulations and boundaries for the 
complex and intertwined dynamics of denaturalisation and renaturalisation of the 
social. 
                                                       
1 I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and the editors of the journal for their 
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
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1 Introduction: Denaturalisation 
or Renaturalisation of Social 
Inequalities? 
At least in their own self-esteem, mod-
ern Western societies follow a logic of 
a continuing "desocialising of nature" 
and "denaturalising of society" (Haber-
mas 1981: 80).2 According to Haber-
mas (ibid.), the basis of this is the 
categorical distinction and separation 
between the "causal connections of 
nature" on the one hand, and the 
"normative orders of society" on the 
other. Apparently, this distinction is of 
central importance for the develop-
ment and justification of social ine-
qualities in modern societies. The self-
perception and moral foundations of 
Western modernity legitimise only 
those forms of unequal treatment that 
are based on social, achieved traits of 
certain persons or groups, while dis-
crimination referring to ascribed, (ac-
tually or presumedly) natural differ-
ences is attributed to "traditional" so-
cieties and is therefore no longer ac-
ceptable.3 In the course of societal 
modernisation, one can thus expect 
that there will be an increasingly pre-
cise distinction between natural and 
achieved traits as well as a tendency to 
denaturalise social inequalities, which 
will result in a gradual repression of 
discrimination based on a certain per-
son's or group's "natural" characteris-
tics (sex, skin colour, race, ethnicity, 
etc.). Of course, modern societies do 
not reach the high standards they have 
set for themselves; discrimination 
based on natural categories still exists, 
and is even produced by those socie-
ties themselves. Nevertheless, modern 
laws and normative systems at least 
delegitimate nature-based social ine-
qualities as, for instance, can be seen 
in the anti-discrimination laws the 
                                                       
2 The quotations from German books or 
journals have been translated by the au-
thor of this article. 
3 Talcott Parsons' (1951: 58-67) well-known 
distinction between "ascription" and 
"achievement" points in the same direction; 
it is based on the distinction between tradi-
tional "community" and modern "society" 
(cf. Münch 2004: 63-69).  
member states of the European Union 
are obliged to sign.4 
The distinction, be it explicit or im-
plicit, between "social" and "natural", 
between the "made" (dem Gemachten) 
and the "grown" (dem Gewachsenen) 
(Habermas 2001) should not be mis-
understood in an objectivist sense. It is 
not a factual, ontological difference, 
but the result of a social practice of 
distinction, a "boundary work" (Gieryn 
1995) performed mainly by science. It 
is not crucial whether certain charac-
teristics individuals or groups are cred-
ited with are "really" of natural or so-
cial origin, but whether they can be 
attributed to either nature or society in 
an uncontested way.5 However, 
according to Habermas (1981: 80), 
modern Western societies are con-
vinced that they (and they alone) make 
the "correct conceptual cuts" between 
natural causalities and social actions. 
The constructive and contingent char-
acter of these "cuts" is hidden by scien-
tific "purification practices" as de-
scribed by Bruno Latour. He argues 
that only these purifications give rise 
to "two completely separate ontologi-
cal zones, that of humans on the one 
hand, and that of non-humans on the 
other" (Latour 1995: 19). In this way, 
the modern distinction between nature 
and society presents itself as merely a 
"discovery" of an objectively existing 
ontological difference that can thus 
claim general validity and unambigu-
ity.  
                                                       
4 The massive protests in Germany in 
spring 2005 against proposed anti-
discrimination laws can be regarded as an 
illustration of the fact that discrimination 
based on (ascribed) natural categories is 
still rampant in the everyday life of modern 
societies – regardless of the normative and 
legal superstructure. 
5 In some cases (for example, regarding 
intelligence) the attribution may be con-
tested; in others it may be changed due to 
new scientific research, for example in the 
area of human genetics. Nevertheless, 
modern societies distinguish mainly with 
the help of the nature-society difference 
between legitimate and illegitimate reasons 
for differential treatment. It goes without 
saying that there is still illegitimate dis-
crimination (for example, concerning reli-
gious beliefs or political convictions) that is 
not based on natural categories. 
Peter Wehling, Social Inequalities  
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What does it mean for the production 
and legitimation of social inequalities 
that the distinction between "nature" 
and "society" has become ambiguous, 
and even seems to evaporate com-
pletely? This thesis is strongly sup-
ported by much of the research re-
cently conducted, particularly in sci-
ence and technology studies (e.g. La-
tour 1995; Amann 2000; Lindemann 
2002; Karafyllis 2003) and in social 
theory, especially within the "theory of 
reflexive modernisation" (Lau/Keller 
2001; Viehöver et al. 2004; Wehling et 
al. 2005). According to these theories, 
the growing scientific and technical 
control of natural processes itself as 
well as the intense social use of the 
resulting options are decisive in terms 
of blurring the nature/society distinc-
tion. I want to take up these argu-
ments and show that both the cogni-
tive-discursive and the practical-
material erosion of the distinction 
between nature and society opens a 
new space of categorical and norma-
tive ambiguity. This new space allows 
the development of phenomena of 
inequality and domination that seem 
to be based on natural categories in a 
new way. The term "renaturalisation" 
can only tentatively describe this ten-
dency since it is not just a revival of 
traditional, ascriptive inequalities. 
Instead, a hybrid, scientifically medi-
ated, and technically manufactured 
"nature" gains relevance for forms and 
processes of social distinction which is 
not regarded as simply "premodern" or 
illegitimate.  
In the following, I will first explain the 
extent to which it is possible to speak 
of an erosion of the modern distinc-
tion between nature and society in the 
light of recent scientific, technological, 
and social developments. I will then 
use two examples – cosmetic surgery 
and predictive genetic testing – to il-
lustrate current tendencies towards 
the renaturalisation of social inequali-
ties. Finally, I will present some gen-
eral theoretical conclusions. 
 
2 Beyond the Modern Nature-
Society-Divide? 
For a long time, modern societies and 
their institutions have relied on the 
belief that the distinction between the 
social and the natural can be drawn by 
science in an objective, unambiguous, 
and universally applicable way. 
Boundaries that have been fundamen-
tal to modern self-perception, such as 
those between facts and values, are 
based on this belief. These boundaries 
play a central role in many institu-
tional spheres of modern societies. 
This is especially visible in professional 
sports: only the results the athlete is 
able to achieve naturally are consid-
ered valid, and this has led to the in-
troduction of an extensive doping con-
trol system. But at this point it also 
becomes clear that the boundaries 
between the "natural" and the "ma-
nipulated" body are no longer unambi-
guous: they are blurred by the use of 
biological substances for doping or the 
supposedly imminent application of 
methods of genetic enhancement 
("gene doping") (cf. Wehling 2003a).  
In recent years, a multitude of topical 
societal debates – for example, about 
the beginning of human life and brain 
death, about global climate change 
and genetically modified organisms – 
have shown that the categorical sepa-
ration of nature and society that had 
previously appeared unambiguous is 
becoming increasingly unclear. Devel-
opments in intensive care medicine 
and transplant surgery, for instance, 
have led to the fact that the common-
sense notion of the end of human life – 
a failure of the heart and lungs – has 
not simply been replaced but supple-
mented by and contrasted with the 
criterion of brain death (cf. Lock 1998, 
2003; Schlich/Wiesemann 2002; Lin-
demann 2003). The answer to the 
question of when a human being is 
considered dead and thus ceases to be 
a social being entitled to a certain pro-
tection has become open to interpreta-
tion and has generated widely differing 
answers. The intensely polarising de-
bates in these areas are indicative of 
the fact that a sharp and uncontested 
"cut" between the natural and the so-
cial is becoming increasingly impossi-
ble. This is not to say that an objective 
boundary that once used to exist is 
now dissolving due to scientific and 
technical innovations. Rather, the sci-
ences that used to guarantee the ob-
jectivity of this distinction are less and 
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less able to fulfil this role, be it that the 
sciences themselves develop varying 
interpretations or that sciences and 
commonsense knowledge come into 
conflict. The former holds true for the 
debate about the legal and moral 
status of the human embryo; although 
it is possible to draw several lines to 
determine when a human life starts, it 
seems impossible to name one objec-
tive, exclusive point in time (cf. Markl 
2004). One example of the latter case 
is the social conflict concerning agri-
cultural biotechnology. Widespread 
notions of the "unnaturalness" of ge-
netically modified foods (cf. Shaw 
2002) clash with the scientific state-
ment that there is no substantial dif-
ference between such foods and tradi-
tional, "naturally" grown produce. The 
consequence of such disputes is not to 
say that modern societies can straight-
forwardly do away with the distinction 
between what is given or "grown" on 
the one hand and what is "made" (and 
thus to be accounted for) on the other. 
However, the redefined and re-
established boundaries are increas-
ingly demonstrating their "reflexive", 
contingent character. Examples of this 
kind of flexibilisation are the rules for 
dealing with cloned human embryos 
and genetically engineered foods, 
which vary greatly on an international 
level, or the ongoing debate about the 
man-made vs. natural origins of cli-
mate change (see Wehling et al. 2005). 
As the historian of science Hans-Jörg 
Rheinberger (1996: 289) supposes in 
regard to biomedicine and genetic 
engineering, we are currently becom-
ing "witnesses to a global and irre-
versible transformation of living be-
ings, including humans, into purpose-
fully constructed beings". The decisive 
factor is that with the advent of mo-
lecular biology, "for the first time ever" 
metabolic processes have become 
"open to manipulation on the level of 
instruction" (ibid.: 291 – italics in 
original). According to Rheinberger, 
the organism itself becomes a labora-
tory: "From now on, it is not the ex-
tracellular representation of intracellu-
lar processes, i.e. the 'understanding' 
of life, that counts. Instead, what mat-
ters is the intracellular representation 
of an extracellular project, i.e. the 're-
writing' of life." (ibid.) As a result, the 
social understanding of "natural" dif-
ferences and inequalities as well as the 
collective and individual dealing with 
them can change profoundly. 
Rheinberger argues that the "mission 
of sociality" no longer seems to be 
"…to neutralise our natural – genetic – 
constitution, but to change it. We are 
becoming aware that the construction 
of a natural constitution of humankind 
is changing into a social construct – 
with the result that the distinction 
between the 'natural' and the 'social' 
no longer makes any proper ontologi-
cal sense." (ibid.: 298 – italics in origi-
nal). The fiction of ontology, promoted 
by the sciences, loses its persuasive-
ness, and thus the idea of the "natural" 
or "grown" no longer seems to serve 
the purpose of cultural and normative 
orientation. Using the examples of 
cosmetic surgery and predictive ge-
netic testing, I want to show how not 
only the overarching distinction be-
tween the natural and the social has 
been eroded, but also how more spe-
cific boundaries – for example, be-
tween illness and health or between 
healing and optimising the human 
body – have become ambiguous. As a 
consequence, there is a tendency to-
wards renaturalising social inequalities 
in modern societies. 
 
3 Cosmetic Surgery: The Techni-
cal Improvement of the Body 
as a Social Norm? 
With the help of aggressive advertising 
and media promotion, the surgical 
remodelling of the body has become 
almost completely disconnected from 
therapeutic contexts (for example, 
healing victims of war or accidents) 
during recent decades.6 It is becoming 
a "mass phenomenon" (Davis 1995: 
                                                       
6 Nevertheless, the boundaries between 
healing of physical deformities and/or the 
ensuing psychological traumas on the one 
hand, and the enhancement and optimisa-
tion of a "normal" and "healthy" body on 
the other are not fixed. Cosmetic surgery is 
thus a striking example of a wider tendency 
towards "dissolving the boundaries of ther-
apy" (Entgrenzung von Therapie) in modern 
societies. The use of medical technologies 
is increasingly expanding beyond well-
defined therapeutic contexts.  
Peter Wehling, Social Inequalities  
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16), a virtually everyday practice that is 
no longer a taboo. In his book "Cul-
tural History of Aesthetic Surgery", 
Sander Gilman states that "the stigma-
tising quality of the procedures seems 
to be diminishing" (1999: 33). It is es-
timated that the number of cosmetic 
operations in the Federal Republic of 
Germany has tripled over the last ten 
years, and that about half a million to 
a million procedures are carried out 
every year (Kahlweit 2004; cf. also 
Degele 2004: 19). For other countries, 
such as the United States, Brazil, or 
China, even more dramatic increases 
in numbers are estimated. Patients are 
becoming younger and younger, and 
although women are still in the major-
ity, more and more men also use cos-
metic surgery.7 
One's "own" body increasingly seems 
to be regarded as something that can 
be shaped to suit one's wishes. Appar-
ently, its "naturalness" and "integrity" 
no longer serve as barriers to technical 
interventions. This becomes interest-
ing for social theory and the sociology 
of social inequalities inasmuch as 
cosmetic surgery is carried out not just 
to enhance self-esteem or recognition 
in the social sphere, but is also becom-
ing a tool of career planning (cf. De-
gele 2004: 15). This seems to be an 
increasingly important motive for cus-
tomers. In the People's Republic of 
China, more than half the university 
graduates interviewed stated that 
"beauty is a decisive advantage in the 
job market" (Maass 2004a: 1). There is 
no question that the use of make-up, 
hair dye, dieting, etc. has always been 
a means of enhancing one's chances in 
the job market or rising through the 
ranks in a company. Cosmetic surgery 
has transformed and radicalised these 
practices by no longer aiming at 
                                                       
7 There is now a debate in the social sci-
ences as to how far these equalizing ten-
dencies will go. While Gilman (1999: 32) 
argues that men will gradually catch up 
with women, Davis (2003: 129) supposes 
"that the present gender gap in cosmetic 
surgery will prevail rather than it will dis-
appear". In any case the motives and con-
texts vis-à-vis the use of cosmetic surgery 
are different for male and female "custom-
ers", and cosmetic surgery is by no means 
"gender-neutral" (ibid.) 
changes on the body but of the body. 
Moreover, these changes are brought 
about by "invasive" surgical interven-
tions that used to be almost exclu-
sively reserved for therapeutic pur-
poses. Such interventions are not only 
risky, painful, and rarely reversible. 
They also massively question the clas-
sic modern idea of the integrity and 
physical invulnerability of the body 
(Negrin 2002: 29). Against this back-
ground, cosmetic surgery can be seen 
as an example of a transition from the 
"natural artificiality" of the human 
being that was conceived by Helmuth 
Plessner (1981) as an anthropological 
invariable to a new and apparently 
much more problematic "artificial 
naturalness" (cf. Schramme 2002: 266-
269). 
The optimisation of the body via surgi-
cal procedures is increasingly becom-
ing a social normalcy and even an 
expectation, at least in certain social 
milieus and segments of the job or 
marriage markets. Along the "border-
line" between nature and society, the 
look of the body is becoming "physical 
capital", as one could say in extension 
of Pierre Bourdieu's differentiation 
between certain kinds of capital 
(Bourdieu 1983).8 Cosmetic surgery 
constitutes the body as an object and 
medium of investment and accumula-
tion of capital to a much higher degree 
than practices such as cosmetics, 
sport, or diets (cf. Negrin 2002: 36). 
Instead of cultural refining or the long 
and disciplined route of doing sports, 
the direct investment of financial re-
sources moves centre-stage; long-term 
individual "achievement" with uncer-
tain results is replaced by short-term 
visible "success" (cf. Neckel 2001). In 
this process, new and mostly anony-
mous societal patterns of domination 
arise – not so much because a fixed 
and (for most people) unreachable 
ideal of beauty is established, but more 
because the flexibility and willingness 
to continuously shape and "correct" 
the body is set as a cultural norm: 
"(N)o one is so beautiful that she can-
                                                       
8 The US singer and actress Cher stated: 
"My body is my capital." She is said to have 
invested about 75,000 US dollars in cos-
metic surgery. (Quote from Davis 1995: 18) 
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not become even more so with the 
help of surgery." (Davis 1995: 18) 
At first sight, this development is tak-
ing place within the framework of the 
denaturalisation programme pursued 
by modern societies. The German phi-
losopher Wolfgang Kersting emphati-
cally celebrates the release from the 
arbitrariness of nature that the appli-
cation of technical means has made 
possible: "With the help of technology, 
humans can emancipate themselves 
from nature and weaken the power of 
fate. Technology liberates via defatali-
sation and by increasing the power of 
control." (Kersting 2002: 294) The 
given and – with regard to beauty, 
strength, etc. – of course unequal as 
well as "unjust" distribution of physical 
attributes between individuals be-
comes the object of conscious and 
purposeful fashioning.9 Feminist au-
thors such as Kathy Davis (1995, 2003) 
rightly point out that women who un-
derwent cosmetic operations try to 
regain control over their bodies and 
their heteronomous social perception. 
But this emancipation from the natural 
body, with all its real or imagined 
shortcomings, also results in a para-
doxical effect of renaturalisation: 
physical attributes such as beauty or 
youthfulness gain enormous impor-
tance, can be used as a means of so-
cial distinction, and can even lead to 
advantages concerning one's career. 
Obviously this is seen less and less as 
questionable or illegitimate, because 
"body looks" are increasingly the result 
of technical modelling and can thus be 
attributed as an acquired trait to the 
respective person: "(W)e have become 
responsible for the design of our bod-
ies." (Negrin 2002: 37) This is equally 
valid if the person has not had cos-
                                                       
9 In this context, it is remarkable that at a 
beauty contest in the People's Republic of 
China in 2004, proof of having had at least 
one instance of cosmetic surgery was a 
precondition for registering for the contest, 
and not – as usual – a reason for immedi-
ate exclusion (Maass 2004b). The organis-
ers rewarded not the ("unjustly" distrib-
uted) natural beauty, but an artificial one 
instead – but this of course cannot be at-
tained and perfected without certain "natu-
ral" bodily preconditions and sufficient 
economic resources. 
metic surgery: even the "natural" body 
that has not been manipulated is re-
garded as something socially imput-
able and as an object of social respon-
sibility. Denaturalisation and renatu-
ralisation of the social merge into one 
another, the distinction between as-
cribed and achieved characteristics 
becomes blurred and starts to lose its 
function of normative orientation. 
 
4 Predictive Genetic Testing: Dis-
crimination or Legitimate Dif-
ferentiation? 
The case of predictive genetic testing 
demonstrates even more markedly 
than cosmetic surgery the newness, 
ambiguity, and ambivalence of the 
renaturalisation of social inequalities. 
The aim of predictive genetic testing is 
the diagnosis of individual genetic 
dispositions, based upon which it is 
possible to forecast, with a greater or 
lesser degree of probability, the occur-
rence of certain diseases such as he-
reditary breast cancer or Huntington 
Disease in later periods of life. For 
three reasons, this is a medical innova-
tion with potentially serious conse-
quences: firstly, predictive DNA tests 
make long-term prognoses over sev-
eral years or even decades. Secondly, 
not only is it often unclear when, but 
also whether the disease will occur at 
all. This particularly applies when it 
comes to widespread diseases such as 
cancer or Alzheimer's that are not ex-
clusively genetically determined, but 
are also dependent on environmental 
factors. Moreover, in many cases sci-
entists dispute the extent to which 
genetic factors actually heighten the 
risk of becoming ill. Thirdly, the devel-
opment of prevention and therapy falls 
short of the rapidly expanding diag-
nostics (cf. Damm 2004: 2).10 
It is not surprising that this asymmetry 
can lead to grave social and psycho-
logical problems. On the one hand, the 
                                                       
10 Genetic factors are held responsible for 
more and more diseases. The number of 
these (putatively) "genetic diseases" regis-
tered in the so-called McKusick Catalogue 
– an important medical database – was 
about 5,000 in 1992, and rose to more than 
14,000 in 2003 (Lemke 2004: 69). 
Peter Wehling, Social Inequalities  
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people or families affected have to deal 
with the specific uncertainties of pre-
dictive genetic testing (cf. Cox/McKellin 
1999): will the disease occur at all, 
when will it happen, and how serious 
will it be? How should one deal with 
the new knowledge and its ambiva-
lences? Is it possible to protect oneself 
against the occurrence of the dis-
ease?11 Or is it preferable to refrain 
from being tested at all because its use 
is dubious, given that prevention and 
therapy are lacking? On the other 
hand, this new form of diagnostics 
creates a new social category of "ill 
without symptoms" (Nelkin 1995) or 
"healthy ill" – the boundary between 
health and illness is being redefined, 
pluralised, and threatens to become 
blurred (Feuerstein et al. 2002: 42). 
Predictive genetic testing has thus 
become part of a tendency to "de-
temporalise" illness, i.e. to expand the 
notion of illness beyond its acute, 
symptomatic manifestation and shift it 
to certain risk factors. Not only genetic 
dispositions, but also obesity and high 
blood pressure are part of these risk 
factors. Risk thus becomes an "illness 
category in and of itself" (Fosket 2004: 
294), and the de-temporalisation of 
illness due to predictive diagnostics 
manifests itself in questions that are 
unusual and difficult to answer: "When 
does an hereditary disease 'begin'? At 
the moment of conception? With the 
knowledge that one has inherited the 
mutation? Once symptoms are unde-
niable? With diagnosis?" (Cox/Mc Kel-
lin 1999: 137) 
With regard to the "pre-symptomatic 
ill", concerns have been raised for a 
few years now about the emergence of 
new forms of "genetic discrimination" 
or even a new "genetic underclass". 
"The term 'genetic discrimination' has 
been used to describe the differential 
treatment of individuals or their rela-
tives based on actual or presumed 
                                                       
11 The best-known example of this dilemma 
is the prophylactic amputation of the 
breasts of women who are genetically "at 
risk" of developing breast cancer (cf. Hal-
lowell 1999). The extent to which muta-
tions of the so-called "breast cancer genes" 
BRCA 1 and BRCA 2 raise the real risk of 
developing the disease is still a matter of 
debate (cf. Lemke 2004: 71-72).  
genetic differences, as opposed to 
discrimination based on phenotype." 
(Geller et al. 2002: 248) Especially in 
the United States, with its privatised 
social service and insurance systems, 
these effects are already starting to 
appear (Geller et al. 2002; Geller 2002): 
people who will only fall ill with a pre-
dicted disease in a few years' time - or 
perhaps never - are nonetheless dis-
criminated against or even excluded 
from the job market, health services, 
and insurance. At the centre of the 
political and legal debates about pre-
dictive testing and genetic discrimina-
tion is the "right to ignorance" (Recht 
auf Nichtwissen, cf. Damm 1999; Weh-
ling 2003b). Although quite unusual 
and unprecedented in modern socie-
ties, this right not to know one's own 
genetic constitution is in principle 
widely accepted. However, there is 
disagreement about the conditions 
under which individuals are obliged to 
get information about their genetic 
condition and reveal it to others (for 
example, to employers or insurance 
companies).12 In addition, the question 
is how one can prevent the exercising 
of this "right to ignorance" from be-
coming a reason for social discrimina-
tion in itself.  
The object of predictive genetic testing 
is not the factual visibility and actual 
presence of "phenotypical" differences 
between individuals. Thus, though not 
exactly in the same way as cosmetic 
surgery, genetic testing also creates 
and is concerned with a scientifically 
and technically manufactured "nature" 
that is taken out of its "real" temporal 
context. This results in many far-
reaching categorical and normative 
ambiguities: may or must people who 
                                                       
12 For the legal aspects, compare Damm 
2004. Recently, the Federation of German 
Insurance Companies has extended the 
voluntary renunciation of obligatory ge-
netic testing for customers signing a new 
contract until 2011. However, the medical 
superintendent of the world's biggest rein-
surance company, the 'Münchener Rück', 
declared only a few months later that, due 
to "fascinating developments", the insur-
ance companies do not want any legal 
inhibition of the option to use genetic 
testing (Frankfurter Rundschau, 22.1.2005, 
4). 
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are genetically "at risk" be treated like 
virtual patients, or is that an illegiti-
mate discrimination against obviously 
healthy people? The epistemic status 
of predictive genetic knowledge itself 
thus becomes contested (cf. Damm 
2004: 15): do the results of predictive 
diagnostics have a special status? Or 
can they be seen as a "normal" form of 
gathering medical information, as 
commonly used by insurance compa-
nies?13 And if so, is it still appropriate 
to speak of genetic discrimination? 
Scientific views on this issue differ 
widely, and mirror the categorical am-
bivalence of the problem. The debates 
focus on the question of whether a 
genetic disposition to certain diseases 
has to be regarded as an objective, 
natural cause or a social, scientific 
construct. The lawyer Jochen Taupitz, 
a member of the German national 
council on bioethics (Nationaler Ethik-
rat), argues that it is only possible to 
speak of discrimination if a person is 
treated differently "without a recognis-
able, factual reason" (Taupitz 2000: 
31). According to Taupitz, the "poten-
tially dangerous genetic disposition" 
(die gefahrerhebliche genetische Dispo-
sition) is "just as much as an illness, 
age, or (…) gender a factual reason for 
differentiation" (ibid.). Here, the ge-
netic disposition is equated with an 
already manifest illness (or with old 
age and gender), and thus objectified 
as a natural fact and cause. The biolo-
gist and philosopher Christoph Reh-
mann-Sutter proposes a different view. 
He criticises the widely acknowledged 
"programme theory of DNA", which is 
also recognisable in Taupitz's state-
ments; it presupposes that the genetic 
programme "contains an instruction to 
develop this characteristic or illness" 
(Rehmann-Sutter 2002: 217). Reh-
mann-Sutter contrasts this view with a 
"systemic theory of DNA", according to 
which a certain gene sequence is in-
deed a trace (ein Indiz), but does not 
already make the disease a latent real-
ity in the present time (ibid.: 218): "The 
BRCA-1-mutation correlates with an 
                                                       
13 Similar debates have recently surfaced in 
Germany, especially with regard to (secret) 
DNA-based paternity testing and the so-
called "genetic fingerprint". 
increased probability of getting cancer 
in the future, and is statistically signifi-
cant; however, it is not an already pre-
sent instruction for cancer." (ibid.: 221) 
In this view, the mutation of the gene 
is certainly a natural fact, but the cor-
relation with the disease is a statistical 
construct, not an objective causal 
mechanism. In any case, it becomes 
evident that the blurring of the 
boundaries between health and illness, 
between factual and interpretative 
statements, between illegitimate dis-
crimination and objectively justified 
differentiation, creates new areas of 
categorical and normative ambiva-
lences that modern societies are not 
yet prepared for.14 As Taupitz's argu-
ments illustrate, new discursive hori-
zons are opened up, in which differen-
tial treatment of individuals due to 
their supposedly natural genetic dispo-
sition can be legitimised or even pre-
sented as necessary. 
  
5 Conclusion: Neutralising or 
Optimising (Human) Nature? 
What can be concluded from the ex-
amples I have given? First of all, I want 
to show why the recent tendencies 
differ from older forms of discrimina-
tion based on "natural" categories. 
Finally, I will show what constitutes 
the new challenges for normative self-
perception as well as the institutional-
ised practices of modern societies.  
Older forms of naturalising social ine-
qualities are mostly based on stigma-
tising people according to supposedly 
natural collectives such as race, nation, 
gender, sexual orientation, etc. that 
were - of course - always socially con-
structed (more often than not with the 
help of the sciences). The individual is 
discriminated against because it is 
seen as part of a larger group, and the 
"natural", presumedly homogenous 
and inalterable characteristics of the 
group are ascribed to the respective 
person. By contrast, renaturalised ine-
                                                       
14 What is new here is that these ambiva-
lences and uncertainties are the results of 
modern biomedicine itself rather than the 
consequences of a lack of "exact" scientific 
knowledge. 
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qualities follow a quite different pat-
tern: they aim at a person's individual-
ised body which is by no means re-
garded as stable and inalterable, but 
increasingly as flexible and shapeable. 
It can thus be attributed as an ac-
quired characteristic. This fundamental 
difference between "naturalised" and 
"renaturalised" inequalities becomes 
very clear with regard to a shift in the 
meaning and role of cosmetic surgery 
over the last few decades. As Sander 
Gilman has shown, aesthetic surgery 
served for a long time as a means of 
rendering invisible physical features 
(such as an "Irish" or "Jewish" nose) 
that were used by dominant groups to 
stigmatise or exclude certain minori-
ties. "Moving into and becoming in-
visible within a desired 'natural' 
group", was the objective of the surgi-
cal procedure (Gilman 1999: 22). In 
this context, it is important to notice 
that "the nineteenth-century 'Jew' who 
desired to be a 'German' assumed that 
'German' was a real category defined in 
nature rather than a social construct" 
(ibid.) Certainly, current cosmetic sur-
gery still serves as a means of covering 
or removing undesirable physical fea-
tures that supposedly do not fit the 
"norm". Yet, it does not primarily aim 
at escaping from collective identity 
constructions and discriminations, but 
instead suggests a positive shaping 
and optimisation of the respective 
individual self, however much that 
may be an illusion. This holds particu-
larly true in the case of women who, in 
the eyes of men, are of course re-
garded as members of a (putatively 
inferior) collective group and thus 
placed into a "constant condition of 
bodily insecurity" (Bourdieu 2005: 
117). Nevertheless, even in this case 
the use of cosmetic surgery does not 
aim at denying or making invisible the 
individual woman's relationship with 
the "natural group", nor does it help to 
break the dominant patterns of per-
ception. Feminist authors justly see 
this as "the dilemma of cosmetic sur-
gery" (Davis 1995). "The limitation of 
cosmetic surgery is that it offers a 
technological solution to a social 
problem." (Negrin 2002: 25)  
The promise of emancipation from the 
"naturally given", together with that of 
individual self-optimisation, is – per-
haps surprisingly – also connected to 
predictive genetic testing. Genetic dis-
positions can of course not simply be 
done away with, but genetic testing 
goes along with both the promise and 
the social expectation that the people 
or families affected will adapt their 
lifestyles to their genetic constitutions 
(cf. Hallowell 1999; Conrad 2002; 
Lemke 2004). Under favourable cir-
cumstances, this may lead to the 
emergence of what Paul Rabinow has 
termed "biosocial" communities, for 
example self-help groups or patients' 
associations that meet on the basis of 
a common genetic diagnosis in order 
"to share their experiences, lobby for 
their disease, educate their children, 
redo their home environment, and so 
on" (Rabinow 1996: 102). What Rabi-
now links with the term "biosociality" 
is the ultimately optimistic expectation 
that, in the future, culture will no 
longer be "biologised" (as in sociobiol-
ogy) but, in contrast, nature will "be 
modeled on culture understood as 
practice" (ibid.: 99). "Nature will be 
known and remade through technique 
and will finally become artificial, just 
as culture becomes natural." (ibid.) The 
results of this "overcoming the na-
ture/culture split" (Rabinow) will 
probably be more ambivalent and 
questionable than Rabinow seems to 
be aware. Especially in the case of 
genetic testing, the "socialisation" of 
nature (denaturalisation) is likely to be 
outweighed and countered by a simul-
taneous "biologisation" of society (re-
naturalisation): "Culture invades na-
ture, while from a dialectical point of 
view it becomes more and more 'natu-
ralized'." (Bertilsson 2003: 119)  
The tendency to renaturalise social 
inequalities does not make individuals 
subject to a fateful (collective) nature. 
Quite the contrary: they are supposed 
or even forced to be responsible for 
their "natural" or "genetic" fate on their 
own. Nevertheless, one should not 
draw too sharp a dividing line between 
the "old" and the "new" forms of ine-
qualities based on natural categories. 
The fact that the insertion of an addi-
tional palpebral fissure to make the 
eye bigger and "more Western" is one 
of the most popular surgical proce-
dures in the People's Republic of China 
(Gilman 1999: 98ff.; Maass 2004a), 
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illustrates that the optimisation of the 
individual body and the adaptation to 
hegemonial, "racialised" body images 
and norms may overlap and even rein-
force each other. Rabinow points out a 
somewhat different potential interac-
tion: "In complicated and often insidi-
ous ways, the older categories may 
even take on a renewed force as the 
new genetics begins to spread not only 
in the obvious racism so rampant to-
day but more subtly in studies of 
'blacks', alleged to have higher suscep-
tibility to tuberculosis." (Rabinow 
1996: 103) 
The normative self-perception and 
institutional practices of modern so-
cieties have hitherto been based – 
more implicitly than explicitly – on a 
remarkable arrangement of natural 
differences and social inequalities that 
is by no means self-evident but rather 
fragile. According to this modern ar-
rangement, natural differences among 
humans are seen as inalterable (or 
alterable only to a very limited degree) 
but at the same time contingent and 
not subject to the responsibility of the 
individual person. Biological inequali-
ties and "injustices" are taken as given 
(or had to be taken as such for the lack 
of technical options). But exactly for 
this reason, it is even more urgent that 
their importance for (and influence on) 
social life should be restricted and 
"neutralised", as Rheinberger (1996) 
has put it, for example by introducing 
anti-discrimination policies. Where 
neutralisation is not possible, there 
should at least be compensatory 
measures on the part of the welfare 
state.15 The new scientific and techni-
                                                       
15 How fragile and contested this arrange-
ment actually is, is highlighted by current 
political and philosophical debates that 
aim at a discursive "renaturalisation of 
social inequalities" (Große Kracht 2004). 
One striking example is the ethics of natu-
ral merits ("verdienstethischer Naturalis-
mus") recently outlined by the philosopher 
Wolfgang Kersting. According to Kersting, 
contingent differences in the natural con-
stitution of individuals are nevertheless 
attributable as a merit. There is thus nei-
ther a right to compensation nor a duty to 
neutralise or compensate for resulting 
social inequalities (Kersting 2000: 369-71; 
cf. for a critical discussion Große Kracht 
2004). 
cal options of "body improvement" 
(Schlich 2001) seem to open up this 
arrangement: physical inequalities 
(even where they are far from being 
diseases or handicaps) are increasingly 
being "corrected" technically, instead 
of being politically neutralised and 
weakened vis-à-vis their social conse-
quences. As Llewellyn Negrin following 
Gilman states, the advent of cosmetic 
surgery has shifted the modern expec-
tation of personal development and 
self-transformation: "(T)he enlighten-
ment belief in the ability of individuals 
to transform themselves, which has 
been articulated as a social and politi-
cal task, came to be redefined in bio-
logical and medical terms." (Negrin 
2002: 25). To a hitherto unprecedented 
extent, the biological constitution of 
individuals becomes a direct object of 
no longer mainly therapeutic but in-
creasingly optimising medical and 
technical interventions (Council on 
Bioethics 2003). It is a seemingly para-
doxical consequence that at the same 
time a manufactured "nature" is pro-
gressively established as a legitimate 
medium of social distinction and dis-
crimination. What is more, the eco-
nomic resources to participate in the 
benefits of body improvement are still 
distributed in a highly unequal way.  
The arguments that only emphasize 
the increase in individual autonomy 
due to these new developments (cf. for 
instance Birnbacher 2002; Kersting 
2002) negate the other side of the coin, 
namely the emergence of dominant 
new norms of behaviour as well as of 
new social inequalities. The negative 
flipside of "defatalisation" (Kersting) 
consists in expanding pressures and 
demands for the optimisation of the 
individual body or, at least, for the 
adaptation of one's lifestyle to one's 
"natural" genetic constitution. The 
emancipation from the natural body 
and its inadequacies merges in the 
self-subordination to the social norm 
of body enhancement.16 Obviously, the 
given physical nature of humans – be it 
considered normatively inviolable or 
factually immutable – no longer serves 
as a boundary for technical manipula-
                                                       
16 This is most visible in the doping scan-
dals of professional athletes. 
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tion that should not be transgressed. 
"When nature no longer provides hu-
man society with its boundary condi-
tions (for normal practices), where will 
they be settled?" (Bertilsson 2003: 119) 
Whether and how it will be possible to 
establish new, socially accepted, and 
institutionally stabilised boundaries for 
the interacting dynamics of denaturali-
sation and renaturalisation of individ-
ual differences and social inequalities 
turns out to be a key question for the 
present "reflexive modern" societies.  
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Abstract 
Categorical distinctions such as healthy/sick or dead/alive serve to provide orienta-
tion and to facilitate decision-making in medicine. This is a major issue in the the-
ory of reflexive modernisation. Recently, new scientific insights within genetics 
have increasingly prompted the re-drawing of such boundaries. Taking the exam-
ple of prenatal testing, with particular reference to late term abortion, I investigate 
the governing rationalities of experts' boundary politics. It will be shown that 
boundary drawing is structured with reference to society's guiding principles and 
notions of normality. In those problematic cases where the medical frame is un-
able to deliver sufficient interpretative power, this reference to societal value orien-
tations turns out to be functional for maintaining the experts' professional author-
ity. In the case of prenatally diagnosable disabilities, for example, experts often do 
not know how to deal with such diagnoses. This ambiguity is for the most part 
understood as (cognitive) uncertainty amenable to more research, rather than in-
terpreted as non-knowledge with reference to the level of social action which re-
sults from the interpretative failure of biomedical frames. Thus, the interpretation 
of non-knowledge appears to become unambiguous, which undermines any pend-
ing politicisation of non-knowledge. The alignment with society's guiding princi-
ples turns out to be functional for maintaining the claim to be able to provide ade-
quate and relevant information and terms for decision-making processes; in other 
words, for maintaining professional authority. On the basis of the observation that 
experts have to deal with uncertainty and non-knowledge, the article asks in con-
clusion whether this could point to the possible emergence of a reflexive type of 
expert. 
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1 Introduction 
Seen from the perspective of sociology, 
human genetics and reproduction 
medicine are a dynamic technological 
field which not only implies a higher 
degree of control in terms of the circu-
lation of expert knowledge, but above 
all introduces new uncertainties and 
design necessities. For example, Gid-
dens (1991) has employed the term 'life 
politics' as a way of analysing repro-
ductive medicine as a motor for the 
transformation of identity practices 
and a new active politics of the physi-
cal. 
The following discussion does not 
address these newly emerging design 
necessities on the level of everyday life 
and common normalised handling of 
new technologies. Rather, it is the level 
of professional action and decision-
making that is of interest here. Espe-
cially in the field of prenatal testing, 
technological progress has overex-
tended institutionalised decision-
making conventions, resulting in novel 
requirements for decision-making and 
design. In connection with the theory 
of reflexive modernisation, this proc-
ess is discussed with reference to the 
concept of boundary blurring ("Ent-
grenzung").1 In our case, this term 
refers to the growing ambiguity of 
categorical distinctions (Beck/Bonß/ 
Lau 2004: 40-41). Such 'boundary 
work' performed by experts is ac-
                                                       
1 "Entgrenzung" means a process of trans-
gressing boundaries or, in a narrower 
sense, a process in which boundaries be-
come insignificant or irrelevant. Boundary 
blurring cannot be equated with dediffer-
entiation ("Entdifferenzierung"), but refers 
to phenomena below the level of functional 
subsystems. Boundary blurring is fre-
quently discussed in sociology, in various 
fields: in connection with flexibilisation 
and autonomisation ("Eigenarbeit") 
(Minssen 2000; Kratzer 2003), with the 
blurring of enterprise boundaries (Powell 
1991; Sauer/Döhl 1997), with globalisation 
and sub-politicisation (Castells 1996; Beck 
1986), and in discussions of the complete 
dissolution of the subject-object differen-
tiation with hybridisation (Latour 1993). 
knowledged as an institutional neces-
sity, not merely a legitimisation strat-
egy of a particular profession. 
The modern biomedical sciences are a 
fruitful field for the analysis of phe-
nomena of boundary blurring. In the 
case of Chorea Huntington, a mono-
genetic hereditary disease, the basic 
principle of distinguishing between 
healthy and sick starts to shift due to 
the divergence between possible early 
detection and the late manifestation of 
symptoms. Is someone who does not 
yet have symptoms healthy, or sick 
because he bears the genetic disposi-
tion which will inescapably lead to the 
manifestation of the disease (Scholz 
1995: 48)? Breast cancer provides a 
further illustration. Although this dis-
ease is attributed to a genetic compo-
nent,2 no strong causality between a 
specific DNA sequence and phenotype 
has yet been demonstrated. Conse-
quently, it is only possible to prognos-
ticate the risk of disease, the extent of 
which remains mostly uncertain 
(Lemke 2004: 71). The distinction 
healthy/sick therefore becomes blurred 
on the level of aetiology. Another ex-
ample is stem cell research. In the 
ongoing ethical debate relating to the 
destruction of embryos as an inevita-
ble consequence of growing embryonic 
stem cell lines, it has become obvious 
that a scientific determination of the 
beginning of life is not possible. Bio-
ethical debates, as a consequence, 
relate to the pluralisation of the 
life/death distinction (Viehöver 2005). 
Cognition-oriented and decision-
relieving boundary constructs in pre-
natal testing are also being stretched 
to the limit as a result of increasing 
scientification and advances in medi-
cine. My interest focuses on the reac-
tion modes of experts, as well as on 
the consequences of these modes of 
                                                       
2 Currently it is assumed that mutations of 
both genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2 (‘breast 
cancer’), which serve to protect against 
tumour growth, contribute to the manifes-
tation of breast cancer. 
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dealing with uncertainty and non-
knowledge. In the following I will ar-
gue that the ways in which experts 
draw boundaries are structured with 
reference to society's guiding princi-
ples (like autonomy, self-awareness 
and individual responsibility) and no-
tions of normality. 
In those problematic cases where the 
medical frame is unable to deliver suf-
ficient interpretative power, this refer-
ence to societal value orientations 
turns out to be functional for main-
taining the experts' professional au-
thority. In the case of prenatally diag-
nosable disabilities, for example, ex-
perts in many cases do not know how 
to deal with such diagnoses. This am-
biguity is for the most part understood 
as (cognitive) uncertainty amenable to 
more research, rather than interpreted 
as non-knowledge with reference to 
the level of social action which results 
from the interpretative failure of bio-
medical frames. Thus, the interpreta-
tion of non-knowledge appears to 
become unambiguous, which under-
mines any pending politicisation of 
non-knowledge. The alignment with 
society's guiding principles turns out 
to be functional for maintaining pro-
fessional authority. 
A challenge for this authority arises 
from prenatal testing being still ethi-
cally controversial. In addition, public 
debates sustain about whether or not 
the ideology of eugenics and of human 
genetics tend to converge. By profes-
sional authority I understand human 
genetics' claims of competence for the 
explanation of the phenomenon of 
disability based on the legitimacy to 
subsume pertinent phenomena within 
the professional interpretation and 
relevance framework. In other words, 
professionals claim to be able to pro-
vide adequate and relevant informa-
tion and terms for decision-making 
processes. I will develop this 
argumentation on the basis of two 
empirical studies conducted within the 
studies conducted within the frame-
work of two research projects.3 
The concept of non-knowledge serves 
to highlight the fact that dealing with 
phenomena such as genetic anomalies 
in biomedical frames is not trivial but 
implies certain expert practices. Obvi-
ously, non-knowledge is – in contrast 
to frequently held beliefs – not neces-
sarily functional for science. By differ-
entiating the term, it will be made clear 
that non-knowledge implies various 
options for dealing with open ques-
tions such as further research or poli-
ticisation. 
From a theoretical point of view the 
intention is to combine two completely 
different sociological discourses, the 
modernisation theory-oriented debate 
about boundary politics (Beck/Bonß/ 
Lau 2004) and the constructivist analy-
sis of non-knowledge (Luhmann 
1995). My aim is to develop a knowl-
edge-sociological analysis of expert 
practice in the field of human genetics, 
critically assessing the competency 
claims of medicine. In the process I 
will introduce the German-language 
sociological debate on non-knowl-
edge, since it has contributed consid-
erably to sharpening this concept (sec-
tion 2).4 On the basis of a typology of 
                                                       
3 The research project "Life-Politics in the 
Risk Society" (No. 8885) was supported by 
the jubilee fund of the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Austria (Oesterreichische Na-
tionalbank) and carried out at the Institute 
for Advanced Studies, Vienna. The research 
project "Life Science in European Society" 
(QLG7-CT-1999-00286) was supported by 
the European Commission, DG Research; 
the Austrian case study was conducted at 
the Institute of Technology Assessment of 
the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna. 
4 So far, the topic of non-knowledge has 
only been discussed in sociological obser-
vation of human genetics in the context of 
the frequently debated right to non-
knowledge (Wehling 2003a). Against the 
background of expanding capabilities of 
predictive genetic diagnostics and possible 
discrimination dangers from employers 
and insurance companies, there has been a 
discussion since the 1980s of the extent to 
which an informal or formal right not to 
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knowledge forms, I will argue that 
prenatally diagnosable disabilities 
transcend the defining categories of 
modern medicine. As a consequence, 
new differentiations and boundaries 
have to be found (section 3). The prob-
lematique of boundary politics is high-
lighted in the case of late term abor-
tion. Legal and medical developments 
are accompanied by the blurring and 
reconstruction of boundaries by ex-
perts, though with a close link to so-
cietal guiding principles (section 4). 
Experts' taking into account of other 
knowledge forms and alternative ra-
tionalities (in counselling and in 
boundary politics) suggests that a re-
flexive type of expert could emerge. I 
argue, however, that these very prac-
tices contribute to the legitimisation of 
a medical genetic interpretation frame-
work for prenatally diagnosable dis-
abilities (section 5). 
 
2 Non-knowledge in the knowl-
edge society 
According to the hypothesis that mod-
ern societies are becoming increas-
ingly fragile, as put forward by Nico 
Stehr (2000), it is precisely because of 
the growing importance of knowledge 
in all areas of life and institutions that 
societal uncertainties and non-
knowledge are coming to the fore. It 
would be an over-simplification to 
treat non-knowledge as a deficit that 
needs to be overcome. According to 
Helmut Willke (2002), knowledge in 
the knowledge society is, in view of 
uncontrollable systemic risks,5 consti-
                                                                 
have to know your own genetic predisposi-
tion can be founded and legally anchored. 
This discussion of non-knowledge, how-
ever, has taken place on the intentional 
level of „not-wanting-to-know" rather than 
on a functional level. 
5 Systemic risks are new forms of risk 
which cannot be localised, or for which 
personal responsibility cannot be identi-
fied; they emerge from an 'interlinkage of 
risks' and usually result in a destabilisation 
of the system. Willke mentions the world 
tuted by expertise in the treatment of 
non-knowledge. Non-knowledge here 
is not characterised by a preliminary 
lack of knowledge, but by a fundamen-
tal uncertainty that cannot be elimi-
nated (ibid.: 11). Willke's notion of 
'crisis', therefore, refers to more than 
mere a loss of credibility or deficiency 
in knowledge. It signifies the inability 
to deal with non-knowledge in a 
competent way, because non-knowl-
edge, being the other, complementary 
side of the coin of knowledge, has not 
yet been appropriated and made 
manageable (ibid.: 18).  
The category of non-knowledge has 
also been systematically introduced 
into the sociology of science. Taking 
the example of high energy experimen-
tal physics, Karin Knorr Cetina (1999), 
for instance, describes a change in the 
epistemology of the natural sciences. 
After the objects of observation, due to 
their physical characteristics, have 
been turned into virtual objects and 
into products of an experimental ma-
chinery, scientists are forced to adopt 
a new methodological self-reflexivity. 
Obstacles to cognition, ambiguities, 
and thus the boundaries of knowledge 
come into the centre of the analysis. 
By making the diverse causes of sys-
tematic misjudgements part of the 
reflection, physics "has forged a coali-
tion with the evil that bars knowledge, 
by turning these barriers into a princi-
ple of knowledge" (ibid.: 64). The 'sim-
ple' generation of knowledge is re-
placed by a process of specifying non-
knowledge. In addition, the door is 
kept open for the production of posi-
tive knowledge.  
The knowledge society presents itself 
as a society which is not just based on 
'knowledge', but also – speaking in 
terms of systems theory – on the 'form' 
of knowledge, i.e. on a distinction 
(prior to the indication of anything 
specific) that equally includes non-
                                                                 
financial system and the Internet as in-
stances thereof. 
Alexander Bogner, Non-Knowledge and Uncertainty 21 
 
 
knowledge.6 Knowledge societies are 
therefore essentially characterised by 
the acute increase in the significance 
of non-knowledge: first, through the 
systematic production of non-
knowledge, and second, through the 
forced societal management of non-
knowledge.7 
Even though the category of non-
knowledge has only recently become a 
subject of systematic reflection and 
conceptual work (see Japp 1997; Weh-
ling 2003b), the interest of sociology in 
this topic can be traced back to the 
point where controversies over risk 
and ecological crises indicated the 
limits of scientific knowledge. Conse-
quently, early conceptualisations were 
developed with close reference to risk 
and uncertainty (Collingridge 1980; 
Wynne 1992; Funtowicz/Ravetz 1993). 
This aspect is still relevant. To date, 
conflicts over risk or technologies 
related to serious ecological and/or 
health damages have been the main 
subjects stimulating empirical analyses 
with a focus on non-knowledge.8 Al-
though these analyses are grounded in 
incongruent basic assumptions, they 
agree that non-knowledge is not nec-
essarily functional for scientific re-
search any more: the basic assumption 
                                                       
6 For the notion of 'form', see Luhmann 
1991: 23, 59-60. 
7 From this perspective, technology as-
sessment (TA) can be seen as an early at-
tempt to achieve institutionalised anticipa-
tion of consequences, though under opti-
mistic assumptions concerning their con-
trol. Accordingly, it is the expert who is the 
only one who knows about the limitations 
of scientific knowledge and the specifica-
tion of non-knowledge (van den Daele 
1996); boundary-drawing between knowl-
edge and non-knowledge appears as a 
cognitive process. Against this background, 
the development of participatory TA 
(Joss/Bellucci 2002; Abels/Bora 2004) can 
be understood as an attempt to ensure that 
experts do not have sole responsibility for  
boundary-drawing.  
8 For the example of chemical policy see 
Böschen (2000); for the example of mad 
cow disease (BSE) see Dressel (2002), Japp 
(2002a). 
that non-knowledge would, inevitably, 
lead to new knowledge is now con-
tested. Thus, non-knowledge is not 
primarily seen as a precondition for 
problem solving, a perspective ad-
vanced by Robert Merton (1987) with 
his notion of 'specified ignorance'. 
Merton argued that in order to gener-
ate new knowledge one has to specify 
non-knowledge, and was the first to 
emphasise the kind of non-knowledge 
that was functional for enabling fur-
ther research. Forms of non-
knowledge that could not be tackled 
were left aside. 
The following discussion deals with 
the conceptualisation of non-knowl-
edge within the two 'grand theories' in 
which it has become most relevant: the 
theory of reflexive modernisation of 
Ulrich Beck, and Niklas Luhmann's 
constructivist systems theory. 
2.1 The modernisation-critical posi-
tion 
Beck (1996) refers to the notion of 
non-knowledge in order to distinguish 
his model of reflexive modernisation 
from alternative perspectives (e.g. Gid-
dens 1990). According to Beck, it is not 
the mere accumulation and globalisa-
tion of knowledge that allows us to 
characterise modernity as 'reflexive', 
but rather the recognition of non-
knowledge. Risks and dangers which 
emerge in the course of the process of 
modernisation must not, for the sake 
of the preservation of the status quo, 
become visible as systemically induced 
consequences of modernisation. Thus 
the struggle over the conditions of 
definition becomes vital for political 
reforms, together with the clarification 
of the boundary between knowledge 
and non-knowledge.9  
                                                       
9 Giddens' theory of modernisation offers a 
somewhat different account; he links the 
reflexivity of modernity closely to the diffu-
sion and circularity of expert knowledge. It 
is not non-knowledge that is the engine 
driving reflexive modernisation, but a con-
glomeration of different mechanisms which 
can be subsumed generally under global-
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According to Beck, in order to arrive at 
reflexivity it is necessary to gain 
knowledge about non-knowledge. 
Non-knowledge appears to be a con-
fined area that is static and objectively 
'given'. The complementary area of 
non-knowledge shares common fea-
tures with his notion of risks as appar-
ently objective and 'pre-discursive' 
threats posed by technology (Beck 
1986). In other words, it appears to be 
independent in its existence of any 
knowledge conflicts (and therefore a 
priori to them), but dependent in its 
scope on current claims (and articula-
tions) of knowledge.10 Insuperable and 
unforeseeable non-knowledge – in 
Beck's terms (1996: 302) a 'Not-being-
able-to-know' ("Nicht-Wissen-Kön-
nen") – does not have a systematic 
place in this perspective, and the 
causes and processes of the constitu-
tion of such non-knowledge are, in 
fact, of secondary interest. Given the 
assumption of the existence of a cer-
tain objectively available ('knowable') 
area of knowledge, the analysis has to 
focus on the suppression and omission 
of non-knowledge ('Not-wanting-to-
know'; "Nicht-Wissen-Wollen"). This 
means that there is a danger of an 
intentional reduction of the problem of 
non-knowledge. 
                                                                 
isation and the institutionalisation of 
knowledge (Giddens 1990). Thus, reflexivity 
appears as a general feature of modernity. 
With the development of an 'institutional 
reflexivity', consequences that are already 
potentially inherent catch up with moder-
nity. Giddens, unlike Beck, does not postu-
late a structural rupture within modernity, 
and he does not need to provide empirical 
evidence of a transition towards a 'second' 
modernity. Compared to Beck, his rather 
linear model of knowledge of reflexive 
modernisation provides less opportunity 
for the endogenous precariousness of 
rationality to become apparent. 
10 In the end, such an epistemological real-
ism assumes the 'accessability' of reality 
through observation; this is supported by 
the argument that it is precisely ignorance 
of, and the denial of knowledge about, the 
dangers to which industrialisation gives 
rise that lead to an increase in real dangers 
(Beck 1996: 311). 
In his attempt to differentiate the cate-
gories introduced by Beck while avoid-
ing the problems mentioned above, 
Peter Wehling (2003b: 124-126) distin-
guishes three dimensions of non-
knowledge. First, he distinguishes 
known from unknown non-knowledge 
(criterion of knowledge). Here, non-
knowledge refers to preliminary 
knowledge gaps and ambiguities, the 
deficient character of which is well 
known. In contrast, phenomena where 
it is still unclear that something is not 
known, or rather, what it is that is not 
known, are referred to as 'unknown 
non-knowledge'. Second, temporary 
non-knowledge is distinguished from 
permanent (enduring) non-knowledge 
(criterion of time). The question of 
whether non-knowledge is insuperable 
or resolvable, i.e. whether it is 'specifi-
able' in the sense of Merton and there-
fore open to further analysis, is espe-
cially important with regard to the 
acceptance and funding of research 
(Wehling 2004: 73). A third dimension 
of non-knowledge refers to the crite-
rion of intentionality. This distinction 
between non-knowledge we are either 
aware or unaware of, with the latter 
being inevitable, is part of Beck's ac-
tion-theoretical perspective. Non-
knowledge is primarily seen as a con-
sequence of individual action and de-
cision-making (what could the actor 
have known? what should he have 
known?); thus, there are significant 
moral implications.11  
Wehling's attempt to discuss the con-
cept of non-knowledge, which still has 
insufficient empirical backing, with the 
goal of systematising it, is instructive. 
His comparatively thorough differen-
tiation of the term is directed against 
the 'thin' typology suggested by sys-
tems theory (see below), and strives 
for the development of a comprehen-
sive research programme. Ultimately, it 
aims to analyse the processes of emer-
                                                       
11 For instance, Wehling (2003: 126) refers 
to non-knowledge sustained in the face of  
better judgement. 
Alexander Bogner, Non-Knowledge and Uncertainty 23 
 
 
gence, communication and processing 
of non-knowledge. These concepts 
allow the reformulation (and an alter-
native discussion) of controversies 
about risk, and empirical case studies 
will indicate their descriptive potential 
(for a first step see Böschen 2002). 
At the same time, Wehling's concept 
bears a certain resemblance to Beck's 
approach. Non-knowledge is concep-
tualised as the result of a process of 
construction and assignment, and at 
the same time non-knowledge refers 
to more or less objectively knowable 
phenomena, thus existing prior to 
(any) discourse. This becomes evident 
in Wehling's description of the hole in 
the ozone layer (2004: 75-79), where 
he analyses the transformation of non-
knowledge with regard to the process 
of catching up with the explanations of 
already manifest consequences (trig-
gered off by CFC). An implicit reference 
to Beck's realism of hazard runs the 
risk of, in principle, considering non-
knowledge as a deficit that needs to be 
overcome. For hazards can only be 
averted with the help of knowledge; 
they grow without such knowledge. If 
non-knowledge remains associated – 
in an ultimately essentialist way – with 
a knowledge deficit or "knowledge 
gaps" (Wehling 2004: 69), then we 
might lose sight of the fact that (non-
)knowledge results from contingent 
processes of construction, which can 
always take an alternative form – to be 
precise, in a way that is independent of 
real progress in knowledge. 
2.2 The constructivist position 
Although Luhmann's analysis of non-
knowledge (1992) has its origin in 
ecological problems, it does not offer a 
criticism of institutions. Rather, the 
radical dimension of this kind of 
analysis results from its epistemologi-
cal approach. In order to perform an 
observation, and hence to generate 
significance, the observer (in 
Luhmann's terminology) must focus on 
one side of the discrimination made 
which subsequently becomes relevant 
for any further operation. Concomi-
tantly, an 'unmarked space' is being 
produced. As this is done, non-
knowledge becomes a necessary con-
stituent of any knowledge production. 
The accumulation of knowledge can, 
according to Luhmann (1995: 177), 
only result in a progressive reproduc-
tion of non-knowledge; there can be 
no gradual transformation of non-
knowledge into knowledge.12 
Japp (1997) follows this conceptualisa-
tion of non-knowledge. It has 
systematically developed the 'eigen-
value' of its object of research. Japp 
distinguishes, in a more pronounced 
way than Luhmann, between specific 
and unspecific non-knowledge.13 
Specific non-knowledge corresponds 
terminologically to Beck's notion of 
'Not-yet-knowledge' ("Noch-Nicht-
Wissen"). Yet unlike Beck, Japp (2002a: 
43-48) places the emphasis on the 
systematic difference between facts 
and form of knowledge. Overcoming it 
is always an accomplishment of 
construction from the viewpoint of the 
observer; therefore, the question of 
connectability ("Anschlussfähigkeit") is 
paramount. Ambiguities can, on the 
one hand, be mitigated (with reference 
to particular value judgements) in such 
a way that non-knowledge is 
characterised as a cognitive problem 
rather than a trigger for political 
conflict. In this sense, specific non-
knowledge is a form of non-knowledge 
that can be normalised on a medium-
term basis and transformed into 
'secure' knowledge, even if there is 
                                                       
12 Apart from the constructivist description 
of non-knowledge, there are also 'realistic' 
points of reference in the systems theo-
rists’ approach. From this perspective, 
non-knowledge is seen as a product of 
complexity and therefore allocated on a 
factual level; see Willke (2002). 
13 In fact, Luhmann (1995) distinguishes 
between specified ('marked') and unspeci-
fied non-knowledge. However, he does not 
look into the sociologically relevant ques-
tions of the circumstances under which 
either of the two kinds of non-knowledge 
is referred to, and what  consequences 
follow from this.  
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even if there is considerable disagree-
ment amongst experts over the course 
of such a transformation. On the other 
hand, specific non-knowledge is a 
form of knowledge that refers to com-
parison or probabilities. Hence, it al-
lows us to bring out uncertainties and 
to ask for risk assessments. In other 
words: the specificity of non-knowl-
edge is emphasised, while non-knowl-
edge (as such) is highlighted – depend-
ing on the degree to which uncertainty 
is accepted and science and technol-
ogy are trusted. 
Unspecific non-knowledge is a con-
struction which rejects the validity 
claims of (expert) knowledge as well as 
those of specific non-knowledge. It is 
a form of societal self-description in 
which uncertainty is labelled as poten-
tially catastrophic. The reaction to 
such a 'potentiality of illimitable dam-
age' is to demand 'avoidance behav-
iour', i.e. not to adopt certain available 
(technical) options. Unspecific non-
knowledge, actually a form of not con-
nectable non-knowledge (how should 
one speak about something that is 
simply unknown?), can only be as-
serted in a meaningful way through 
the communication of the 'catastrophe' 
as a symbol of what is to be avoided 
(Japp 2002b: 436). This is the case 
especially when new and unknown 
phenomena or developments are re-
garded as beyond the scope of scien-
tific knowledge. This means that in 
principle, they transcend the explana-
tory potential of scientific knowledge, 
are considered unpredictable and un-
controllable with regard to science, 
and furthermore become, or are turned 
into, a potential threat. We can under-
stand this process as a generalisation 
of non-knowledge. 
The political consequences of this 
generalisation with regard to knowl-
edge and technological conflicts are 
well known. The assignment of unspe-
cific non-knowledge involves the dan-
ger, as Helga Nowotny (2005: 41-42) 
argues with regard to the loss of au-
thority of experts, that laypersons re-
nounce their loyalty to experts and 
consider taking the 'exit option'. They 
could abandon the discourse with 
scientific experts and 'cross over' to the 
political system: they could, by means 
of initiatives or demonstrations, influ-
ence science, legislation and the regu-
lation of research.  
One of the strengths of the 
constructivist position is that it helps 
to understand non-knowledge as a co-
produced phenomenon and therefore 
as a logical necessity. The sociologi-
cally relevant questions, then, are how 
processes of acknowledgement of 
(non-)knowledge develop, and how 
claims of (non-)knowledge turn into 
(non-)knowledge. Following an impor-
tant trend in science research one can 
ask, for instance, in which way a rep-
resentational relationship is estab-
lished between 'clean', decontextual-
ised laboratory objects and the reality 
of nature (e.g. Latour 1999: chapter 2). 
Wehling's differentiated terminology is 
probably the best way of capturing 
such processes, if they can be captured 
at all. 
Japp's strict constructivism, on the 
other hand, could overcome the per-
spective of a symmetrical relation be-
tween knowledge and non-knowledge 
(i.e. that acquiring knowledge should 
inevitably be linked to reducing non-
knowledge). Due to the absence of a 
privileged observer position, assigning 
something to knowledge or non-
knowledge is, in the end, a normative 
decision. Non-knowledge is therefore 
a construction that leaves open every 
political option. In some situations, 
and in the view of those who look 
sceptically at a plan or project (for 
whatever reason), the readiness to 
acknowledge non-knowledge is so low 
that critics and whistleblowers can 
easily prevail. In other situations, there 
is no communication about non-
knowledge or rather non-knowledge is 
communicated as uncertain knowl-
edge or knowledge not yet established, 
irrespective of any perceived advance 
in knowledge. 
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Finally, from such a perspective non-
knowledge appears less as a cognitive 
but rather as a social phenomenon. A 
certain way of communicating, in the 
case of unspecific non-knowledge 
often associated with the (aggressive) 
claims of persons affected (Japp 1999: 
30), is taken as a certain way of as-
signing non-knowledge. As a result, 
conflicts not necessarily centred 
around ecological risks also become 
accessible to the category of non-
knowledge. The following investigation 
of prenatal testing uses this perspec-
tive. 
 
3  Prenatal testing, its develop-
ment and its relevance 
Prenatal testing and genetic counsel-
ling span the fields of human genetics 
and medicine. While prenatal testing in 
the early 1970s was merely a sideline 
for human geneticists, it has since 
differentiated itself from the field of 
human genetics, become successfully 
institutionalised, and now, as part of 
gynaecology, is considered a core as-
pect of pregnancy care (Nippert 
1991).14 In 1966 the first cultivation of 
foetal cells suspended in amniotic fluid 
was successful. This was seen as a 
decisive step towards the cytogenetic 
and biochemical detection of foetal 
anomalies. The first prenatal detection 
of Morbus Down was performed in 
1968. 
While prenatal testing is not restricted 
to DNA analyses (in fact the majority of 
examinations employ ultrasound), 
prenatal testing has now become an 
important field of activity for genetic 
counselling. Current figures show this. 
                                                       
14 Prenatal testing includes examinations 
and tests relating to the development of 
the foetus over the course of pregnancy. 
Ultrasound is the most common form of 
non-invasive prenatal testing. In addition 
there are invasive diagnostics, i.e. surgical 
interventions which sample cells from the 
unborn child and test them, mostly for 
Down’s syndrome (amniocentesis, chori-
onic villus sampling). 
In 1970, when prenatal testing was 
introduced in Germany, only six am-
niocenteses were registered.15 Shortly 
thereafter prenatal testing was added 
to the catalogue of services provided 
by compulsory health insurance and 
already by the mid-1980s (in the 
meantime chorionic villus sampling 
(CVS) had been introduced) over 
30,000 amniocenteses and 3,000 CVS 
were registered.16 In 1999 alone ap-
proximately 70,000 invasive examina-
tions were performed. This means that 
roughly every tenth pregnancy in-
volved invasive diagnosis (Nippert 
1999). 
An important factor in this normalisa-
tion process was the way in which 
various court decisions obliged doc-
tors to promote the potential of prena-
tal testing to women over the age of 
35. Hennen et al. (1996: 78) state that 
prenatal testing has almost become a 
standard examination in pregnancy 
care for women over 35. While prena-
tal testing is still ethically controver-
sial, it is predominantly directed to-
wards the early detection of Down's 
syndrome, and is currently the only 
way of preventing the birth of disabled 
children. 
3.1 Transgressing traditional catego-
ries 
In the case of prenatal testing, the 
consequences of an ongoing scientifi-
cation process make it necessary to 
draw boundaries. Recently, Ronald 
Hitzler and Michaela Pfadenhauer 
(1999: 99) have pointed to the fact that 
                                                       
15 Amniocentesis involves removing amni-
otic fluid in the 16th to 18th week of preg-
nancy by means of transabdominal punc-
ture of the uterus. Foetal cells from the 
amniotic fluid are cultured and analysed in 
the laboratory, mostly for chromosome 
anomalies such as Down’s, Klinefelter, and 
Turner syndrome. 
16 CVS involves removing chorionic tissue 
(a preliminary stage of the placenta geneti-
cally derived from the foetus) by means of 
a needle inserted through the abdominal 
wall or vagina. As with amniocentesis, 
chromosomes (or DNA) can be analysed. 
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improved techniques for diagnosis 
have resulted in precarious data ac-
quired at a very early point in time, 
which transcend the way of coding 
(and separating) 'healthy' and 'sick', a 
constitutive element of modern medi-
cine.17 Our case supports this notion. 
With the help of early prenatal testing 
(e.g. measurement of the nuchal trans-
lucency thickness18), certain distinctive 
features considered to be reliable indi-
cators of the Down's syndrome (so-
called 'soft-markers') can be diagnosed 
as early as the tenth week of preg-
nancy. While Down's syndrome consti-
tutes a chromosomal aberration and 
as such, with regard to the genetic 
paradigm (related basic analysis: ge-
netically normal/abnormal), an abnor-
mality, it is difficult or impossible for 
the prenatal diagnostician to identify 
its 'clinical implication', in other words 
its 'meaning', with regard to the medi-
cal code (healthy/sick). In practice, it is 
obviously difficult for the expert to 
determine medically operationalisable 
criteria to decide whether an abortion 
                                                       
17 According to the medical code, in 
Luhmann's (1990) terminology, disease 
represents the positive side of the distinc-
tion as it is operationally connectable and 
therefore corresponds to the 'goal of ac-
tion' or the teleology of the system. The 
fact that human genetics establishes a new 
dichotomy, so to speak behind the back of 
medicine, is a development Luhmann was 
aware of. Health is differentiated by the 
introduction of the new categories 'geneti-
cally burdened/not burdened'. However, 
Luhmann confined himself to perceiving 
the interdependency between basic coding 
and (genetically induced) secondary dis-
tinction as a proof of the stable autonomy 
of the medical system. It remains, however, 
unclear how this secondary distinction is 
practically operationalised and what the 
consequences are. In the end, a reasonably 
unconflictual interdependency of the two 
codings has quite a few preconditions; all 
complexity associated with the diagnosis of 
'being genetically burdened' has to be 
countered by discharge mechanisms ("Ent-
lastungsmöglichkeiten") within the logic of 
the medical system. 
18 This measurement is an ultrasound 
evaluation of the thickness of the neck fold 
of the foetus. 
after prenatal testing is legitimate or 
not. The following interview passage 
illustrates the practical difficulties 
involved:  
It is ethically unproblematic if my pre-
natal diagnosis is anencephalus19; I 
spare the woman a pregnancy, includ-
ing the risks of a pregnancy, and the 
child anyway has no chance of survival 
(…) It is more tricky in the case of vi-
able deformations; because here, of 
course, at some point the question 
arises, how disabled does a child have 
to be that I categorise it as ethically 
justifiable to seriously consider the 
early diagnosis, so that I can perform 
an abortion/kill it? (1:17/41:52) 
Within the continuum of viable dis-
abilities (quantitatively) accounting for 
the major part of prenatal testing, it is 
obviously difficult, on the basis of 
medical knowledge, to provide 'trigger 
points' unconditionally linked to cer-
tain strategies of action, unless the 
diagnosed deformations or genetic 
defects can be reformulated within the 
traditional categories of medicine so 
that they become unambiguous. This 
is the case with anencephalus, because 
it is described as a kind of deformation 
not allowing life after birth. In this 
case it is the distinction alive/dead 
that, as a distinguishing criterion, pro-
vides orientation and relief with regard 
to the decision taken. 
The difficulty of boundary-drawing by 
means of expert knowledge becomes 
apparent from the fact that the expert 
does not pursue, and does not try to 
operationalise, the question of when it 
starts to be 'tricky' to perform prenatal 
testing. The social consequences of 
such a blurred boundary can be ob-
served on the level of interactions. Last 
but not least, in view of professional 
codes regarding genetic counselling, it 
can be said that for such a decision it 
                                                       
19 Severe deformations in the central nerv-
ous system, caused by a defective closure 
of the neural tube in the development of 
the foetus; babies lack the skullcap and 
substantial parts of the brain. 
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is obviously no longer sufficient to 
refer to expert knowledge alone. Ac-
cordingly, the norm-setting, goal-
oriented, hierarchically structured 
consultation of an expert is not con-
sidered appropriate any more.20 
Against this background, it becomes 
understandable why the unprejudiced, 
process-oriented and client-centred 
ideal of counselling has become so 
popular, as it is easily reconcilable 
with the central value of modern medi-
cal practice, i.e. the autonomy of the 
patient.21 
3.2 A typology of non-knowledge 
I shall now relate the blurring of 
boundaries to some arguments from 
the sociology of knowledge. On the 
level of different forms of knowledge, 
we can essentially distinguish three 
categories: ignorance, uncertainty, and 
non-knowledge. 
a) Ignorance refers to an inadequate or 
preliminary form of knowledge that 
has the potential to be corrected. Prac-
tically, it is about mistakes, errors and 
false statements that can subsequently 
be clarified, for instance by empirical 
data or through a critique of science or 
ideology. From a sociological point of 
view, this level is of secondary impor-
tance.  
b) Uncertainty, or uncertain knowl-
edge, is located on a cognitive level. As 
already mentioned, two forms of un-
certainty can be distinguished with 
regard to human genetics: diagnostic 
uncertainty (what is the probability of 
                                                       
20 A corresponding plea for non-directive 
forms of counselling, which provide exten-
sive medical-genetic information support-
ing individual decision-making, can be 
found, for example, in GfH (1996). For a 
criticism of the ideal of non-directivity in 
counselling methodically grounded in 
participant observation of counselling 
interviews, see Bosk (1992). 
21 From the perspective of human genetic 
counselling, see Reif/Baitsch (1986). A 
summary with regard to the changing con-
cepts of counselling from the perspective of 
discourse analysis is provided by Wald-
schmidt (1996). 
a disease on the basis of genetic dis-
position?) and prognostic uncertainty 
(when will a disease appear and how 
will it develop?). 
Uncertainties related to indication and 
diagnosis play a crucial role with re-
gard to prenatal testing. In the frame 
of early prenatal testing (e.g. meas-
urement of the nuchal translucency 
thickness), the woman gets a 'risk fig-
ure', an expression of the individual 
probability of giving birth to a disabled 
child (for example: 'you have a risk of 1 
in 500'), rather than a definitive as-
sessment of the genetic status of the 
child.22 A traditional yes/no diagnosis is 
replaced by a statistical calculation. 
Not 'healthy' or 'not healthy', but 
probably healthy, but maybe not 
healthy. Whether a probability of 1 to 
500 means healthy or sick is ideally 
left to individual interpretation.  
These kinds of uncertainty can be as-
sociated with the notion of specific 
non-knowledge, because they have a 
strong emphasis on cognition. At the 
moment there are no ways of trans-
forming this uncertainty into knowl-
edge, but there is precise knowledge 
about the kind of deficient character of 
this knowledge and thus usually an 
idea of how non-knowledge can be 
translated into knowledge on a me-
dium-term basis. This form of knowl-
edge is therefore in principle 
characterised by connectability 
("Anschlussfähigkeit"). In practice, this 
means that there is confidence in 
being able to overcome, at least on a 
medium-term basis, the preliminary 
character and the ambiguity of 
knowledge with the help of additional 
and more extensive information, more 
precise measurements and tests, better 
qualified specialists, and so on.23 
                                                       
22 In terms of probability the calculation of 
risks includes, on the one hand, the statis-
tical basic risk correlated with the age of 
the woman. The variation, i.e. the individ-
ual specification of risk, results from the 
measurement of the nuchal translucency 
thickness.  
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cialists, and so on.23 However, the 
people affected may perceive uncer-
tainty as a fundamental and irreducible 
problem. But even in this case (of as-
cription of risk) the problem is framed 
as having the 'right configuration', i.e. 
it is not perceived as a problem that 
would transcend the professional 
frame of interpretation and relevance. 
c) Non-knowledge: it is crucial for my 
argument that the notion of non-
knowledge is not defined in a cognitiv-
ist way (i.e. as a problem of inadequate 
knowledge progress), but rather re-
lated to the level of social action. The 
notion of non-knowledge correlates to 
disabilities that can be discovered by 
prenatal testing and that are supposed 
to transcend bio-medical possibilities 
of interpretation. From this perspec-
tive, non-knowledge is characterised 
by the fact that expert knowledge is 
unable to 'grasp' the specific phenom-
ena; it cannot really assess their sig-
nificance. This should not be under-
stood in the sense that prenatal testing 
would be incapable of understanding 
what is 'constitutive' of disability. The 
argument that medicine can no longer 
claim objectivity as a reference for its 
practice is not an epistemological one. 
It is a sociological argument: with 
regard to certain disabilities, medicine 
obviously can no longer refer to the 
kind of objective meaning which would 
normally result from the close link 
between expert knowledge (diagnosis) 
and decision (treatment), and which 
finds expression in the stable character 
of the distinctions healthy/sick and 
normal/abnormal. The practical 
implications for action described 
above are the result. In the context of 
claims of being affected, this problem 
can entail the radical negation of 
medical knowledge claims (Japp 
2002a: 47). 
                                                       
23 Against this background, the attempt to 
isolate foetal cells from the mother’s blood 
in order to get early and reliable evidence 
about forms of trisomy (Hahn/Holzgreve 
2001) implies the perpetuation of a particu-
lar research logic. 
If we agree with Luhmann that the 
constitution of knowledge is the result 
of a successful ascription of necessar-
ily ambivalent information to a sup-
posedly secure knowledge (and non-
knowledge is therefore a 'construction 
defect'), the analytic benefit of the ter-
minology introduced becomes some-
what clearer: due to its ambiguity, 
disability leaves open several options 
of ascription. By referring to hege-
monic discourses and cultural values it 
can, for instance, be clarified in a way 
that identifies non-knowledge as a 
cognitive problem (consequence: de-
mand for more precise test results, 
better therapies etc.). In this case, non-
knowledge becomes framed as uncer-
tainty. Alternatively, by referring to 
different discourses and alternative 
value orientations, the ambiguity at-
tached to disability can also become 
effective as a tool for the repulsion of 
scientific claims of cognition. In this 
case non-knowledge is not connected 
to the option of continuing scientifica-
tion, but is opened up to external criti-
cism – with politicisation as a conse-
quence. 
Taking the institutionalisation of pre-
natal testing in to consideration, one 
can ask which discourses, norms and 
rules would help to normalise the un-
derstanding of professional practice as 
an appropriate configuration of the 
problem. In what follows, I will ana-
lyse the rationality of concrete bound-
ary-drawings in order to reconstruct 
these discourses and norms.  
 
4 The politics of boundary-
drawing 
Modernisation theory sees boundary-
drawing as essentially related to the 
postulate of boundary blurring ("Ent-
grenzung") of institutions and guiding 
principles. From this perspective, "Ent-
grenzungen", i.e. the dissolution or 
pluralisation of categorical distinctions 
(Viehöver/Gugutzer/Keller/Lau 2004), 
are regarded as indicators of the 
emergence of a 'second' modernity. 
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According to Beck et al. the epochal 
rupture consists of the fact "that the 
guiding ideas of western modernity 
have become questionable because of 
the dynamics of secondary effects" 
(2001: 25). The category of boundary-
drawing becomes interesting for the 
theory of modernisation for one main 
reason: because of its strong hypothe-
sis of an epochal rupture, the theory is 
highly dependent upon criteria for 
empirical testing. A central argument is 
that modernity is reflexive from the 
moment when, as a consequence of 
scientific and technical developments, 
habitual boundaries and patterns of 
thinking are dissolved by means of 
risks and dangers released by (and in) 
the process of modernisation. Such 
boundaries as the difference between 
nature/society, life/death, or healthy/ 
sick (Viehöver 2005) are fundamental 
to the self-understanding of moder-
nity, because they constitute action 
and decision-making resources as well 
as mechanisms for assigning respon-
sibilities. 
From this point of view, boundary 
work provided by the experts is there-
fore regarded as an expression of an 
institutional dynamic, but not as a 
form of strategic management of sym-
bolic boundaries such as Gieryn (1983) 
would propose.24 His concept of 
'boundary work' focuses on the way 
science appropriates, by means of 
boundary work, resources related to 
the privileged position of science, such 
as credibility, prestige and power 
(Gieryn 1995). Finally, the scope of the 
autonomy of science needs to be 
maintained and science needs to be 
protected from external control, for 
                                                       
24 Gieryn (1983: 782) characterises the 
boundary work of scientists as 'ideological 
efforts'. The way he poses his main ques-
tion, "What images of science do scientists 
present to promote their authority over 
designated domains of knowledge?" (ibid.: 
783), indicates that he understands the 
ideology (of 'scientificality') as an active 
and strategic process of establishing 
boundaries. 
example by delimitating it from other 
functional systems such as policy. 
The boundary-drawing discourse of 
human genetics can therefore be stud-
ied from at least two perspectives. On 
the one hand, boundary construction 
by experts can – with regard to politi-
cal and ethnic conflicts – be seen as a 
strategy designed to legitimise profes-
sional authority (see Cunningham-
Burley/Kerr 1999; Bogner 2004). Mod-
ernisation theory, on the other hand, 
chiefly  considers the way experts deal 
with the opening up of the scope for 
decision-making, a field which is sub-
ject neither to traditional claims nor to 
formal regulations.  
The boundary work of experts can be 
illustrated by taking the urgent prob-
lem of late term abortion as an exam-
ple. The reconstruction of the rational-
ity underlying boundary construction 
in this case can inform us about the 
discourses and value orientations that 
enable experts to provide and imple-
ment the authoritative notions and 
concepts for the interpretation of dis-
abilities to be discovered by prenatal 
testing; the legitimisation of decisions; 
and, thus, the societal debate about 
disabilities. 
4.1 Late term abortion: the prenatal 
boundary between life and death 
Advances in neonatal medicine have 
contributed to rendering the prenatal 
line between life and death more fluid. 
This has become especially problem-
atic with regard to the recently 
amended German abortion law. In the 
course of the 1995 amendment the 
temporal limitation for an abortion 
previously set at the 22nd week (orien-
tated towards the boundary of viabil-
ity) was eliminated. In principle, in 
case the foetus is classified as a 'haz-
ard' to the physical or mental health of 
the pregnant woman, the doctor may 
induce an abortion (if the pregnant 
woman consents) up until shortly be-
fore birth (StGB § 218a, section 2). The 
situation in Austria is similar with re-
spect to the penal code. According to 
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Austria's abortion law (in force since 
1975), an abortion based on eugenic 
indications may be conducted up until 
shortly before birth (StBG § 97, section 
1, item 2). 
The dissolution of a definitive, albeit 
pragmatic demarcation presents a 
serious challenge for a gynaecologist. 
Performing an abortion between the 
22nd and the 24th week of pregnancy,25 
at a time when the child is generally 
considered viable, can get doctors into 
a difficult situation with serious con-
sequences.26 Obviously, an absurd and 
irreconcilable dilemma arises if a (non-
punishable) abortion makes necessary 
to perform an act of active euthanasia 
in order to pursue the original inten-
tion. On the other hand, it is obvious 
that the need to take such decisions 
tends to result in a practice which is 
regulated by experts themselves.  
With regard to the exigency of having 
provisional-moral boundary constructs 
(Beck/Bonß/Lau 2004: 15), referring to 
a viability boundary as a criterion of a 
time limit for late term abortions (as 
suggested for example by chamber of 
medical doctors in BÄK 1998) does not 
help in the individual case. Firstly, this 
threshold is fluid as a result of ad-
vances in neonatal medicine, and of 
course it varies in individual cases. 
Finally, the actual week of pregnancy 
cannot even be determined with abso-
lute accuracy. Hence, boundaries keep 
                                                       
25 A late term abortion in practice essen-
tially means the inducement of labour in 
anticipation that the child will be stillborn. 
In some cases a so-called foetocide is 
performed in order to be sure. Prior to the 
abortion, the foetus is killed by means of a 
potassium chloride injection to the heart. 
26 In Germany around 1,500 abortions are 
performed annually after the 22nd week of 
pregnancy, according to an article in the 
German magazine "Der Spiegel" (Friedrich-
sen/Ludwig 1999). The Federal Agency of 
Statistics reported 190 abortions in 1997, 
but the director of the Hospital Doctors’ 
Association of the Marburger Bund, Frank 
Ulrich Montgomery, estimates approxi-
mately 800 late term abortions per year 
(Sperber 2001). 
dissolving as it is no longer possible to 
discern, based on medical diagnostic 
methods, on which side of the border 
one stands at a concrete point in time. 
But even if one disregards ambiguities 
and the need to interpret viability crite-
ria there must be exceptions, either 
due to medical or eugenic indications 
or in cases when, for example, the 
results of an amniocentesis are re-
ceived very late. Hence prenatal diag-
nosticians and gynaecologists are 
faced with the problem of having to 
redraw the prenatal line between life 
and death. Ultimately, the boundary 
construction provides an immediate 
guideline for professional action and 
decision-making. For us, as a result, 
the ensuing question relates to the 
interpretations and considerations 
supporting these boundary construc-
tions. 
4.2 The pluralisation of the life/death 
distinction 
The prenatal boundary between life 
and death, prior to its dissolution over 
the course of the abortion reform, had 
been drawn by the law - which itself 
was orientated toward medical 'facts' 
('the boundary of viability'). For us this 
raises a new and interesting question, 
namely how scientific, judicial or phi-
losophical knowledge plays a role in 
the reconstruction of this boundary. In 
any case, the problem of late term 
abortions is no longer regulated by 
formal law but rather by the informal 
boundary politics of experts. It is the 
experts who are formulating processes 
for dealing with this problem in publi-
cations (e.g. von Kaisen-
berg/Jonat/Kaatsch 2005), in directives 
and statements of professional asso-
ciations (e.g. DGGG 2003), at symposi-
ums and congresses, and also on the 
level of day-to-day internal coopera-
tion and team meetings in hospitals. 
This subpoliticisation, however, is not 
tantamount to an exclusive orientation 
towards medical genetic expertise. In 
the following it will be shown that 
ethical or philosophical knowledge is 
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also of significance for the reformula-
tion of boundaries. 
It is possible to reconstruct the logic of 
boundary-drawing in expert discourse 
based on its discussion of exceptional 
cases. Two different argumentation 
types have been analytically identified 
in connection with the manner in 
which experts classify exceptional 
cases. On the one hand, there is an 
effort to fall back on medical criteria as 
a way of drawing a boundary. This 
means that the legitimisation of late 
term abortion is founded on a poor 
survivability prognosis for the foetus. 
By referring once again to viability in 
this way the pragmatic boundary of the 
former abortion law is more than just 
revived, since this criterion may also 
now be applied to the period after the 
22nd week of pregnancy when deci-
sions are still possible. 'Non viable 
deformities' or 'untreatable diseases' 
consequently represent legitimate 
exceptional cases for late term abor-
tions according to the experts I ques-
tioned asked. In an attempt to concre-
tise such terms when they need inter-
pretation, experts tend to draw on the 
medically most clear-cut cases. A con-
crete example is anencephalus which, 
based on a very low survival probabil-
ity, is characterised by experts as a 
'death-like' condition. In such a case 
the continuation of the pregnancy is 
usually deemed pointless or an unnec-
essary risk for the woman. The diag-
nosis 'anencephalus' is therefore asso-
ciated with the demarcation dead/alive. 
Ultimately in this type of argumenta-
tion, the distinction between life/death 
is in a way reintroduced on the side of 
life (i.e. in the time period open to 
decision-making, starting with the 
viability boundary). In view of the in-
terpretational dependency of the ex-
ceptional case, this can be viewed as a 
pluralisation of the demarcation. 
The second type of argumentation may 
also be considered a pluralisation of 
the demarcation, but in a stronger 
sense, since a rationality different than 
that of medicine has a bearing. In this 
case experts do not legitimise late term 
abortions according to the life/death 
distinction set out above. Here, the 
boundary-drawing which becomes 
action-orientative for a problematic 
case beyond the viability boundary, 
refers to the distinction between per-
sonal and non-personal life. Further 
elaborated, this distinction provides 
the basis for the bioethical debate 
which ties granting the right to life to 
the criterion of personhood (e.g. Too-
ley 1979; Singer 1979). The following 
interview passage serves to illustrate 
this second argumentation type, and 
sums up the argument in a very reflex-
ive way. 
Expert (E): I think Prof. N and I both 
found a rather sensible solution to the 
problem of late term abortions here in 
the department. (...) We have a formu-
lation that we draw a line starting with 
the 23rd plus 0th week. In other words, 
the beginning of the 24th week and 
thereafter – and that is now the formu-
lation of T. from A. – the confidence in 
prenatal testing on the one hand, and a 
considerable lack of cognitive develop-
ment on the other must be very likely. 
Yes? Well, if you start at the end of the 
spectrum: anencephalus. There's no 
gestation age limit for anencephalus. 
 
Interviewer (I): Spina bifida?27 
E: No. Well, spina bifida must be diag-
nosed with much care. If associated 
with a large hydrocephalus, then yes, 
this is precisely a case in which one 
has to consider this formulation. 
I: So what exactly is considered a se-
vere cognitive defect? 
                                                       
27 A congenital deformity of the spine and 
spinal cord (‘cleft spine’) which can appear 
in very different degrees of severity. Disor-
ders accordingly range from slight impair-
ment of the ability to walk to paraplegia 
with bladder and intestinal dysfunctions. 
Most of the time spina bifida is associated 
with hydrocephalus (excessive accumula-
tion of cerebrospinal fluid within the cra-
nium). 
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E: Well. Yes, I have the formulation of 
personhood which is used in philoso-
phical writing. Also, someone lacks a 
consciousness of his own existence, no 
feeling of past and future and no inter-
action with others. That would be the 
criteria of personhood, and there are 
such children. That can be operational-
ised up to a certain point. 
I: So that can really be operationalised? 
E: Yes. Yes, that can be operationalised. 
So when it's clear that this child will 
never be able to have interaction with a 
counterpart, whether from a philoso-
phical or theological point of view, it 
will not develop a consciousness of its 
own self, it will not develop a con-
sciousness for the past or future, or for 
any other perspective, then, well…. 
(2:113/632:677) 
This second argumentation type can 
be considered reflexive in as much as 
the fiction of a clear possibility of dif-
ferentiation is dismissed by means of 
the viability criterion. Diagnoses come 
to the fore (e.g. spina bifida) which are 
ambiguous, and which remain hidden 
in the first argumentation type and 
then must be decided ad hoc in prac-
tice. The professional orientations to 
action as observed in the second case 
are directed toward criteria founded in 
ethics rather than medicine. In the end 
an effort is made to solve the problem 
of drawing the line by referring to ethi-
cal rather than medical categories. By 
means of the term personhood, man-
kind is divided into purely biological 
life forms and persons characterised 
by autonomy, rationality and self-
awareness. For the legitimisation of a 
late term abortion this essentially boils 
down to the distinction between a 
dignified and undignified life (although 
not from a perspective with a eugeni-
cally objectified 'worth living' orienta-
tion). The terms autonomy and self-
awareness thereby entail specific de-
mands for actively shaping the individ-
ual's life through anticipation and acts 
of choice (Rose 1998). As general prin-
ciples of governing the individual's life 
in late modernity these terms consti-
tute, in such a perspective, guiding 
principles of society. In the bioethical 
concept of personhood, these guiding 
ideas essentially support a logically 
consistent convergence on a universal 
concept for the valuation of life. 
The question of the (by no means un-
problematic)28 relationship between 
bioethical discourse and societal no-
tions of normality becomes important 
in the light of the general question of 
the significance of normality concepts 
for professional actions and decision-
making. Beyond the present context, 
one can ask which framework of ac-
tion, for example an expert lacking the 
pertinent training in bioethics, when 
forced to make a decision. According 
to the perspective developed here, it 
will be a framework of action which 
has been delimited in a logically con-
sistent manner by bioethics and cen-
tred on the guiding principle of auton-
omy. Since – in line with the liberal 
school of bioethics – moral impera-
tives are developed from the hege-
monic value system of society and the 
normative is strictly anchored in the 
empirically observable (Braun 2000: 
108-135), the bioethical discourse 
must be understood as an expression 
as well as an elaboration and generali-
sation of societal normality concepts 
that are crystallised in the fundamental 
questions: What is a life worth living? 
What is a human being? 
 
5 Conclusion and outlook: re-
flexive experts? 
Prenatal testing is marked by scientifi-
cally technical dynamics which un-
                                                       
28 The logically compelling argument of 
utilitarians for permission to kill newborn 
babies (since a newborn can never be a 
person) will meet with resistance from the 
population. However, it is precisely the 
stringency of analytical operations which 
suggests, with the reference to normality, a 
need to adapt biopolitical norms and regu-
lations in a way that would result in the 
liberalisation of contra-intuitive practices.  
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dermine the stability of institutional-
ised decision-making conventions. 
Decision and design necessities for 
experts result from the evolving ambi-
guities of categorical definitions 
(healthy/sick, life/death) which require 
new boundary constructions. Specific 
professional orientations to action 
have been reconstructed here by 
analysis of these constructions. In the 
process it became clear that concrete 
professional orientations to action 
draw their cognitive-oriented and le-
gitimising power from the implicit 
reference to society's guiding princi-
ples and notions of normality. These 
societal guiding principles operational-
ise themselves, according to the exam-
ple of the more or less subpolitical 
regulation of late term abortions, in 
the form of a certain ideal of rational-
ity. Categories such as autonomy, in-
teractivity or self-awareness together 
make up the differentiation between 
person/non-person, a complement to 
the blurred life/death distinction. Ad-
mission into a social community there-
fore no longer depends on biological 
but on cognitive criteria, which require 
a minimum command over oneself as 
a precondition for a life worth living. 
But the revaluation of an impartial, 
process-oriented and client-centred 
counselling ideal, which is centred 
around the guiding principle of indi-
vidual decision-making autonomy, 
also illustrates the close link between 
professional practice and society's 
guiding principles. In connection with 
the problem of boundary drawing, this 
revaluation can be regarded as an in-
dication that the reference to expert 
knowledge no longer appears suffi-
cient for the reformulation of prena-
tally diagnosable disabilities in the 
medical code, nor for the distinction 
between legitimate and non-legitimate 
practice as a consequence. On the 
level of discourse, the hegemony of a 
liberal autonomy principle seems to be 
expressed in the counselling ideal 
which has become the guiding princi-
ple for the regulation and handling of 
'life and death questions' in the context 
of (bio-)medical progress.29 According 
to Erwin K. Scheuch (2003), in the light 
of this close link between professional 
action orientations and society's guid-
ing principles it would be conceivable 
to speak of the "meaning of the spirit 
of the age for medicine". 
Far-reaching conclusions follow con-
sidering the non-knowledge problem 
mentioned earlier. The concept of non-
knowledge has been linked with pre-
natally diagnosable disabilities be-
cause it can be, and is in practice, as-
sociated with transcending in principle 
the scope of interpretations of medi-
cine. Hence, non-knowledge as a 'phe-
nomenon of assignment' is based on 
the legitimacy of the scientific 
interpretational framework. This 
conception analytically sensitises us to 
the question of which factors contrib-
ute to making 'objects to be dealt with' 
legitimate objects of research practice. 
Regarding the institutionalisation and 
normalisation of prenatal testing (as 
described), one can assume that the 
reference to society's guiding princi-
ples is a factor both in boundary poli-
tics and in the redesign of the counsel-
ling process. This factor is dysfunc-
tional for a broad challenge to knowl-
edge claims or for formulating a gen-
eral suspicion of irrelevance. Provided 
experts draw boundaries conforming 
to norms and their decisions largely 
correspond to the expectations of so-
ciety concerning what is acknowledged 
as their job, what is considered worth 
knowing and possible to say, and 
which taboos exist,30 non-knowledge 
                                                       
29 From the range of existing bioethical 
literature, the following sources can be 
cited as theoretically elaborated and influ-
ential in practice: for a pragmatic perspec-
tive Beauchamp/Childress (1994), and for 
more general accounts Harris (1991) and 
Charlesworth (1993). 
30 Not only eugenic practices and value-
attributing counselling are taboos. An im-
portant taboo which cannot be further 
elaborated here is the application of prena-
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is not communicated. Consequently, 
professional authority (as defined in 
section 1) does not need to be called 
into question.31 Non-knowledge re-
mains a cognitive problem and not a 
reason for politicisation. Hence, non-
knowledge is not necessarily dysfunc-
tional for science; however, it is not 
per se functional, a point Merton has 
already captured in his interpretation 
of a necessary 'specification'. 
In view of the self-relativisation of 
experts in the course of the revaluation 
of client-oriented counselling or the 
experimental raising of ethical aspects 
within the field of prenatal testing, one 
can now ask whether we can observe a 
reflexive type of expert emerging in the 
case of human genetics, as May and 
Holzinger (2003) have suggested. They 
argue that, as a special field in medi-
cine, human genetics with its aetiology 
and improved diagnostic techniques 
transcends the established paradigms 
and principles of medical knowledge. 
Experts are forced to communicate 
uncertainty, which makes the rele-
vance of human genetic knowledge 
appear questionable to the client and 
is therefore dysfunctional for the 
medical monopoly on interpretation 
and for expert status (ibid.: 105). The 
revaluation of a layperson's perspec-
tive in genetic counselling, i.e. the 
tendency to dissolve the traditional 
dichotomy between experts and lay-
persons, can be interpreted as reflexiv-
ity on an institutional level. The taking 
into account of the blurring of the 
distinction healthy/sick in professional 
practice indicates the cognitive level of 
the reflexivity criterion. 
From a sociology of science perspec-
tive which focuses on the underlying 
                                                                 
tal testing for sex determination (GfH 
1990). 
31 The expert practices mentioned cannot 
be equated with strategic intentional ac-
tion. In fact, my analysis was guided by the 
assumption that certain practices and 
demarcations can be read ex post as func-
tional for the legitimacy of professional 
authority. 
rationalities of counselling and the 
decision-making process, reservations 
are certainly in order concerning the 
hypothesis of reflexivity. In today's 
reality the expert in fact no longer has 
the power to make decisions and issue 
directives. However, in the context of 
the interpretation presented here, the 
(undoubted) dissolution of asymmetri-
cal interaction relationships in genetic 
counselling must be read differently 
than as a reference to the contours of 
a reflexive modernity. A larger degree 
of autonomy indeed signifies a loss of 
professional authority pretending to 
offer socially binding solutions to 
problems. This, however, does not 
amount to a loss of relevance for ex-
pert knowledge. The expert who sees 
himself as an impartial and client-
oriented information provider, and 
whose decisions and demarcations are 
ultimately structured based on hege-
monic concepts of normality, does not 
seem questionable; if anything, the 
opposite is the case. His knowledge, 
his terminology and his profession are 
instrumental in the prenatal debate 
about the phenomenon of disability. 
The problem awareness and reflection 
of laypersons cannot be separated 
from the sensitisation by the criteria 
and categories which are significantly 
influenced by medical expertise. 
Hence, the expert has the power to 
decide who and under what conditions 
is allowed to participate in the deci-
sion-making process and which terms 
will be used in that process. 
From this perspective, reflexivity would 
require the possibility of dealing with 
the experts' interpretation schemes 
and definitions of relevance in a reflex-
ive way to be structurally embedded in 
the context of pregnancy care, for ex-
ample in the form of an institutionali-
sation of alternative forms of knowl-
edge in the counselling process. 
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Abstract 
This paper explores current changes in German copyright legislation in two fields 
in which the digitalisation of creative works has changed the relationship between 
commercial and non-profit activities: the music industry and scientific publishing. 
For years the music industry has been facing a decreasing demand due to Internet 
distribution and filesharing networks and a lock-in of traditional business models. 
Scientific work is confronted with a supply crisis of information. The resources of 
libraries, which traditionally used to mediate commercial and non-profit activities,  
are dwindling while the role of commercial databases and meta-information sys-
tems for academic reputation is gaining importance. 
These processes are well known, but both the current public debate and theoretical 
analyses suffer from a certain essentialism: The problem of intellectual property is 
mostly seen as inherent to the characteristics of knowledge goods and knowledge 
production. Thus, the arena appears like a zero-sum game to both commercial ac-
tors and promoters of the public domain, in which commodified goods are sub-
tracted from the public domain and vice versa. This paper applies a process-
oriented and interactionist sociological perspective to the shifting relationship of 
markets and public spheres. Knowledge goods and intellectual property institu-
tions thus are mutually constitutive. In establishing them, situated flows of knowl-
edge and meaning are bracketed institutionally and technologically for a time. 
However, current changes in copyright legislation tend to privilege commercial 
exploitation and thus may end up establishing the very zero-sum configuration 
that so far has been challenged theoretically. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, issues of intellectual 
property have moved out of the do-
main of legal specialists and profes-
sional authors and inventors. Teenag-
ers using the Internet, farmers or soft-
ware developers find themselves con-
fronted with intellectual property 
claims and possible infringements. 
Public debates on patents for living 
organisms or software, on piracy and 
private copying reach the general 
press. With and through the regulation 
of intellectual property, knowledge 
societies negotiate the boundaries of 
markets and public spheres and seek 
ways of handling knowledge, culture 
and innovation – all of which are sup-
posed to be key resources for eco-
nomic success and social welfare. 
This paper applies a sociological per-
spective to these processes of negotia-
tion which is not limited to rational 
interests and property rights. From an 
interactionist and constructivist view, 
actors in these fields of negotiation do 
not just distribute resources but in-
deed constitute them as such. Neither 
do they just establish rules and re-
sources (Giddens 1984), but configure 
entire ensembles out of practices of 
creating and consuming, roles of au-
thors and audiences, and economic 
and social exchange relations, in 
which norms and values play as much 
a part as interests and strategies.1 The 
institutions of intellectual property 
thus do not simply present an enabling 
and constraining framework for action. 
In this field they become a dynamic 
object of action, discourse, power and 
influence themselves. 
                                                       
1 This theoretical outlook shares the per-
spective on process and the mutual consti-
tution of institutions and actors with 
Werle's actor-centered institutionalism 
(Werle 1998). Due to its subject matter it 
focuses on a wider range of actors includ-
ing social movements and civil society, and 
addresses both strategic action and norma-
tive and expressive orientations of actors in 
the field (cf. Döbert/van den Daele 2002).  
While this view may be almost com-
monsensical to sociological ap-
proaches to knowledge and technol-
ogy, this paper argues that both public 
debates and theoretical reflections on 
intellectual property and the public 
domain mostly restrict themselves to 
an essentialist view. The significance 
of the public domain and the need for 
copyright protection are ascribed to 
specific properties of knowledge goods 
and knowledge production. Thus, the 
intellectual property regime appears 
like a zero-sum game to companies 
interested in property rights and to 
promoters of the public domain, in 
which either intellectual "property is 
theft" or freely circulated digital goods 
are just stolen profit ("piracy").  
In the perspective developed here, 
knowledge goods and intellectual 
property institutions will be seen as 
mutually constitutive, temporary re-
sults of an institutional/technical 
bracketing of situated flows of knowl-
edge and meaning. However, the cur-
rent changes of intellectual property 
governance with their privileging of 
markets and property rights, in combi-
nation with the likely strategies of 
commercial actors in the field, may 
end up implementing the very zero-
sum configurations that players in the 
field evoke – with the added imbalance 
of a fortified property regime and an 
impoverished public domain. 
This paper does not claim to be more 
than an exploratory study. It is part of 
a broader study on the boundaries of 
economic and organisational sociology 
in which the author seeks to address 
the question: how do companies, insti-
tutions and social norms and move-
ments draw the boundaries of mar-
kets, private and public spheres; shape 
goods and services; and configure and 
challenge customer and other non-
work roles in relevant arenas of 
knowledge societies (Holtgrewe 
2005)?2 The present analysis is based 
                                                       
2 This paper began as a Habilitation talk 
at the Faculty of Social Science of Duis-
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on a review of literature, an analysis of 
the recent media and public debate on 
copyright legislation in Germany, an 
analysis of relevant actors' websites 
and participation in workshops and 
conferences on intellectual property 
and public goods. 
The paper first introduces the key con-
cepts of the public domain (1.1) and of 
copyright (1.2). In the second section it 
discusses the theoretical concepts 
relevant to the subject: The economics 
of information goods (2.1), the mod-
ernist sociological concepts of the 
knowledge society in the Mertonian 
tradition, and the concept of the con-
textuality of knowledge (2.2). Section 3 
analyses the contexts of music (3.1) 
and scientific publishing (3.2) through 
a modified value-added chain concept 
which includes non-profit activities of 
knowledge creation and absorption. 
Section 3.3 analyses recent changes in 
copyright law which are relevant to 
these empirical fields. The discussion 
and conclusion in section 4 first com-
pares the configurations and path-
dependencies for relevant actors in the 
empirical fields (4.1) and then draws 
conclusions for the politics of intellec-
tual property and the public domain 
(4.2).  
1.1 The public domain 
The public domain emerges in the de-
bates about copyright and its limita-
tions as a somewhat diffuse and nor-
mative concept which is opposed to 
                                                                 
burg/Essen University in 2003. Other ver-
sions were presented as contributions to 
the 4th Austrian Conference of Technology 
Assessment on June 7th 2004 in Vienna and 
to the plenary session 1 on "Knowledge, 
Power and Inequality in Knowledge Soci-
ety" conference of the German Sociological 
Association in October 2004 in Munich. I 
am grateful for the comments and ideas 
provided by the participants of these con-
ferences and to Jens Aderhold, Virginia 
Doellgast, Andrea Fried, Christian Kerst, 
Manfred Moldaschl, Michael Nentwich, 
Peter Sanders, Karsten Weber and two 
anonymous reviewers. Of course the au-
thor remains responsible for all remaining 
misconceptions and imprecisions. 
the establishment and extension of 
intellectual property rights. As a legal 
term, it means the status of a creative 
work which is not protected by copy-
right laws (in German: "Gemeinfrei-
heit")3 and may be used, reproduced 
and distributed by anyone either be-
cause copyright has expired (e.g. 70 
years after the death of the author in 
German and US copyright law), be-
cause it is generally exempt from copy-
right (e.g. government publications) or 
because the author has failed to estab-
lish copyright (Gasaway 2003, cf. Les-
sig 2001: 20). "Public domain" or open 
source/free software thus mostly is not 
literally in the public domain, but the 
copyright holder permits such use  (or 
a specific range of possible uses) to 
anyone through the terms of the li-
cence. In its more general use in de-
bates on knowledge, the Internet and 
copyright, the public domain means 
the sphere of freely accessible knowl-
edge and/or cultural goods that may be 
circulated, used and further developed 
by anyone. This is possibly put more 
precisely by terms such as the "creative 
common property" or, in a good Ger-
man translation, the "Wissensall-
mende" (Grassmuck 2000). Behind 
these programmatic terms is the gen-
eral idea that this common property is 
the "seedbed" for any production of 
creative work and innovation: produc-
ers of knowledge and cultural goods 
inevitably stand "on the shoulders of 
giants" or at least those of other crea-
tive people: "In the digital world, all 
the stuff protected by copyright law is 
in one sense the same: It all depends 
fundamentally upon a rich and diverse 
public domain." (Lessig 2001: 50) 
1.2 Basic concepts of copyright: Insti-
tutionalising creativity 
The chief institutions of intellectual 
property that grant property rights to 
inventors and authors of intellectual 
creations are 
                                                       
3 http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pub-
lic_Domain, retrieved February 5th 2005. 
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• patents,  
• copyright,  
• copyright contract law,  
• trademark protection,  
• and trade secrets (Leadbeater 
2001). 
The following sections will focus on 
German copyright and after discussing 
the basic concepts, on copyright in 
digital spaces. German copyright pro-
tects "personal intellectual creations" 
("persönliche geistige Schöpfungen", § 
2 (2) UrhG), e.g. works in science, arts 
and literature. Notably, copyright in 
general does not protect ideas but 
their instantiation – nobody can claim 
copyright on the form of a sonnet or 
the method of narrative interviewing, 
for example. Copyright addresses both 
property rights and non-commodified 
claims. Different from US or British 
copyright, continental European copy-
right distinguishes between the au-
thor's personality rights and the rights 
of exploitation. Since authors' person-
ality rights cannot be transferred, the 
author and her "intellectual and per-
sonal relations to the work and its use" 
(§ 11 UrhG) are not subject to com-
modification. Personality rights reserve 
the author's right to decide on publica-
tion and communication of the con-
tents and assure her right both to be 
recognised as the author of the work 
and to prohibit distortions and im-
pairments. In contrast, the rights of 
exploitation and use can be trans-
ferred, i.e. the rights of reproduction, 
distribution, exhibition and perform-
ance. Such rights can be simple or ex-
clusive and may be limited spatially, 
temporally or with regard to content. 
German copyright has so-called "barri-
ers" ("Schranken") which regulate fair 
use. They permit the reproduction of 
works or parts of works for church, 
school or teaching use, the rendition 
for non-profit purposes or for the re-
porting of current events, citation and 
the making of private copies. Some of 
these uses are compensated through a 
fee on photocopiers, audio- and video-
cassettes. For specific media and tech-
nologies there is a range of special 
regulations. 
This brief summary makes it obvious 
that copyright confers 'thinner' and 
more relational property rights than 
property in land, cars, computers etc. 
(but cf. Strathern 1999 on the cultur-
ally specific concepts of property). 
They cut certain modes of exploitation 
use and communication out of the 
general production of culture and 
knowledge. This point is also made by 
Bowrey and Rimmer:  
"Copyright locates legal rights to cul-
tural production within a system of 
interdependencies. It is not really the 
case that copyright creates two com-
peting domains - private and public. 
There is no private 'domain' in a closed 
sense. The boundaries that exist are 
permeable. This is because ownership 
is determined by overlapping cultural 
limitations that express the realities of 
that copyrightable work's genesis, and 
enable similar relations with other cul-
tural producers to the benefit of cul-
tural production generally. For exam-
ple, fair use, taking of insubstantial 
parts, taking ideas but not the expres-
sion, and limits to the duration of pro-
tection all interrupt the owner's 'do-
main'. There are no 'walls' around the 
copyrightable work in that property 
sense." (Bowrey/Rimmer 2002) 
The barriers of copyright thus address 
such practices of use that are institu-
tionally situated outside the market. 
With their focus on educational uses 
they support especially the production 
of new or future knowledge and the 
socialisation of future producers – an 
area in which markets tend to fail. In-
tellectual property and knowledge as a 
public good thus are interrelated 
rather than complementary.  
Currently both copyright and patent 
law are being changed on the level of 
legislation, jurisdiction and practical 
implementation. The majority of these 
changes aim at  
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• a stronger protection of intellectual 
property, 
• an extension into previously ex-
empt areas, 
• shifts between the domains of 
trademark, copyright and patent 
law, 
• and a redistribution of functions 
between the state, the respective 
industries and technology. 
They are triggered by  
• international agreements (WIPO, 
TRIPS; GATT); 
• EU directives harmonising intellec-
tual property; 
• and US-American law (cf. Kuhlen 
2004). 
The structural reasons for these 
changes can be found in changing 
modes of innovation: On the techno-
logical side, science, technology and 
even previously basic research are 
moving closer to actual and potential 
markets, and they are increasingly 
evaluated in terms of their commercial 
potential. In the cultural industries, a 
long process of mergers and acquisi-
tions has continued. Media and distri-
bution modes have multiplied, and the 
Internet has become a cheap but hard 
to control way of distributing and us-
ing digital goods. 
In Germany, copyright law is being 
adapted to meet the requirements of 
the EU Copyright Directive 2001/29/EC 
on the "Harmonisation of certain as-
pects of copyright and related rights in 
the information society" in two steps. 
The first amendment became effective 
on September 13th, 2003, the second is 
currently under legislation. The new 
regulations will be discussed in section 
3.3. 
 
2 Economy and sociology of 
knowledge 
2.1 The economic view of information 
goods 
From an economic point of view, the 
current problem of intellectual prop-
erty rights is tied to the characteristics 
of digital goods (Stehr 1994; 2001; 
Kuhlen 1995; Quah 1996, 2003; Cor-
tright 2001; Hutter 2000, 2002). They 
are immaterial and non-rival – my en-
joyment of a Nick Cave song or a lec-
ture by Lawrence Lessig is not affected 
by others listening to the same song or 
lecture. The cost of producing digital 
goods is concentrated on the first in-
stantiation. If cultural or knowledge 
goods become digital, the cost of re-
production and distribution gets very 
small. Cultural and knowledge goods 
are also generative (Moldaschl/ 
Diefenbach 2003) or recombinant 
(Quah 2003): Their use enhances their 
value since it is accompanied by com-
munication. Knowledge generates new 
and emergent knowledge, and cultural 
production draws on previous cultural 
products and practices.  
For all these reasons, markets for digi-
tal goods are likely to fail or to have 
severe limitations and 'leaks'. Tradi-
tionally, markets in knowledge goods 
have been based on the materialisa-
tions of these goods, and intellectual 
property rights regulate the rights to 
produce and distribute these materiali-
sations: Books, vinyl records and CDs, 
journals or videocassettes are of 
course rival and material – but they 
still can be copied at low cost. Yet even 
such pre-digital markets have been 
complemented by other, non-profit 
modes of distributing knowledge and 
cultural goods: By public libraries, 
mass media, institutions of education 
and training, 'alternative' and commu-
nal cultural centres, and by interper-
sonal networks of friends taping audio 
cassettes or lending books. Notably all 
these distribution modes do not simply 
replace the market. They inform and 
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educate audiences and shape their 
competencies and tastes. 
The establishment of intellectual prop-
erty rights over knowledge and cul-
tural products gives potential creators 
(or distributors) of knowledge goods 
an incentive to produce by assigning 
them a temporary monopoly over the 
reproduction and distribution of these 
goods – provided that it is chances of 
material gain which motivate produc-
ers. However, intellectual property 
governance is dilemmatic since on the 
other hand it limits the circulation of 
and the access to knowledge and cul-
tural goods – which do not just pro-
vide education and entertainment but 
also form the basis for further creation 
of knowledge. If the knowledge good 
has been produced already, its maxi-
mal (free) distribution may maximise 
social welfare and enjoyment. On the 
other hand, if prices drop to zero, the 
risk of not making a profit or even re-
cuperating the cost of creating a new 
knowledge good may be a disincentive 
for potential creators (Quah 2002: 8). 
As Richard A. Posner, former chief 
judge of the US court of appeals, 
phrased it: "Granting property rights in 
intellectual property increases the in-
centives to create such property, but 
the downside is that those rights can 
interfere with the creation of subse-
quent intellectual property." (Posner 
2002: 12) 
Intellectual property rights thus medi-
ate the interests not just of producers, 
distributors and consumers of knowl-
edge and cultural goods, but they also 
implicitly articulate past and future, 
actual and potential knowledge crea-
tion and circulation.  
Digitalisation now de-materialises and 
de-spatialises knowledge and cultural 
goods thoroughly. Hence, the dilemma 
of intellectual property rights is wid-
ened. Access to cultural and knowl-
edge goods is potentially global, given 
Internet access. The limitations or 'bar-
riers' ("Schranken") of intellectual 
property rights that permit the non-
profit and educational use ("fair use") 
of cultural goods no longer tie in with 
the previous temporal/spatial bounda-
ries of these uses: Music may be dis-
tributed beyond circles of friends to 
millions of fellow enthusiasts, libraries 
may make and distribute digital copies 
of books and journals.  
From a Marxist point of view, this is an 
instance of the capitalist contradiction 
between forces and relations of pro-
duction. Brödner et al. pointed out this 
contradiction in 1981: the use of data-
bases under capitalist conditions 
would lead to a monopolisation and 
commodification of information which 
in turn requires a strict regimentation 
of information exchange in order to 
maintain the value of these goods 
(Brödner et al. 1981: 148; cf. Boyle 
2000). On the other hand, the expan-
sion of human knowledge and sociali-
sation of production increase the need 
for general access to information and 
render this monopolisation socially 
counterproductive (Brödner et al. 
1981: 150).  
2.2 Knowledge communism and con-
textuality 
Sociological approaches address the 
subject of intellectual property in 
terms of the knowledge society. Ap-
proaches within modernisation theory 
emphasise the aspect of unfolding 
forces of production. Mertonian com-
munism (Merton 1973) in science is 
expected to expand to other spheres of 
knowledge production. Stehr for ex-
ample (1994; 2001) argues in this vein 
that the central character of knowl-
edge as a force of production chal-
lenges the institutions of property and 
the economics of scarcity. He regards 
knowledge as a "capacity for action" so 
that in knowledge societies these ca-
pacities are redistributed, empowering 
small groups of actors. 
In current debates on intellectual 
property and the public domain, left 
wing and libertarian views are more or 
less explicitly based on these modern-
ist and Marxist concepts. In Germany 
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they are pursued for example by the 
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (2000, 2002, 
2002a), the Green Party's think tank 
(cf. also Hofmann 2002; Kuhlen 2002 
and other contributions in prokla 126; 
Lutterbeck 2002). In this view, the in-
creasing relevance of knowledge is 
seen as a dialectical process between 
forces and relations of production, e.g. 
an empowerment of labour power ver-
sus the dominant institutions of prop-
erty and power. André Gorz writes: 
"Transforming capital opens up the 
perspective towards a society of 
knowledge and culture but resists its 
development in order to retain its 
power." (Gorz 2002: 28, translation 
UH) 
Currently among the authors repre-
senting digital neo-Marxism we find 
optimistic and pessimistic positions. 
Optimists (such as Gorz 2002; Mauri-
zio Lazzarato 1998; or Paul Adler 2002, 
2003) emphasise the possibilities of 
knowledge production beyond the 
market and its inherently free and co-
operative logics. Pessimists describe 
an ongoing capitalist expansion and 
exploitation (Rifkin 2000) leading to 
observable social polarisation.  
At this point, the perspective of the 
sociology of knowledge brings in a 
contrasting view. It emphasises the 
contextual, processual, potential and 
generative character of knowledge. 
Here the focus is on the practical and 
embedded utilisation of knowledge. 
Knowledge may be tacit or explicit (Po-
lanyi 1985); individual or collective 
(Lam 2002); and all these forms and 
aspects of knowledge are articulated in 
its utilisation (e.g. Håkanson 2002; 
Malhotra 2003). Knowledge thus con-
sists of heterogeneous ensembles of 
knowledge goods, of "knowledge ma-
chines" (Rammert 1999, 2003) of ex-
pertise embodied in human brains, of 
intersubjective sensemaking processes 
requiring attention, selection and un-
derstanding (Weick 1995), of commu-
nities and networks of practice (Lave/ 
Wenger 1991) and so on.  
This complexity, fluidity and heteroge-
neity of knowledge lead Michel Callon 
to argue against the Mertonian tradi-
tion, that even science does not pro-
duce essentially public goods. The very 
contextuality of knowledge makes it 
exclusive. Scientific statements by 
themselves are useless and only their 
utilisation and re-contextualisation 
render them effective and valuable: 
"Knowledge cannot be applied without 
being transformed." (Callon 1994: 405) 
These transformations are costly: they 
require not just time and attention, but 
also the use and maintenance of com-
plementary goods, i.e. they require in-
formation work (Kuhlen 1995). In this 
view, the appropriability and (non-)ri-
valry of knowledge goods are gradual: 
"Degrees of appropriability and of ri-
valry are the outcome of the strategic 
configurations of the relevant actors, 
of the investments they have already 
made or are thinking of making." (Cal-
lon 1994: 407) 
Contrary to the view of knowledge 
economics which abstains from these 
processes, in order to become a 
knowledge good, knowledge needs to 
be explicated, decontextualised and 
packaged, and in order to be used, 
these goods need to be recontextual-
ised, unpacked, and absorbed. 
It is the explicated and materialised 
bodies of knowledge and culture, i.e. 
knowledge goods, that are the objects 
of intellectual property rights. Their 
(possible) market value may consist in 
their innovativeness, since new and 
innovative knowledge is scarce (Stehr 
2001), but innovativeness is of course 
relational and needs to be compatible 
with existing knowledge. With regard 
to cultural goods, originality and dis-
tinctiveness may confer market value – 
but so may the conformity to current 
tastes and fashions. 
Taking the sociology of knowledge 
perspective into account, both intellec-
tual property and the public domain 
thus are not static institutions framing 
strategic action but are instantiated 
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and contextualised in and through 
processes of production, distribution 
and use of digital goods. Their legal 
regulation enables and restricts par-
ticular modes of production and use, 
but it does not determine them. Regu-
lation becomes even less deterministic 
if boundaries between public goods 
and markets become permeable and if 
actors' options and perspectives multi-
ply. 
 
3 Producing, exploiting and us-
ing digital goods: popular mu-
sic and scientific publishing 
In the following sections we shall ex-
plore the connections between mar-
kets, non-profit distribution and use, 
economies and norms in two fields, 
music and scientific publishing. While 
music is one of the classical domains 
of cultural industries, science just as 
classically is thought to constitute a 
public domain – but in both cases the 
emerging picture is rather more patch-
worked. 
3.1 Failing from previous successes: 
the music industry  
The music industry, like the film indus-
try, represents the traditionally com-
mercial distribution of cultural goods. 
However, the anti-commercial critique 
of artistic avant-gardes and subcul-
tures is just as traditionally connected 
to 'alternative' ideas of creatively con-
necting producers and audiences. 
The industry is highly concentrated. 
After a long history of mergers and 
acquisitions, the last of which was 
Bertelsmann Music Group's merger 
with Sony Music in 2004, four major 
labels share roughly 80% of business 
volume and dominate the industry as-
sociations accordingly. Yet the global 
market is stagnating at about 40 bil-
lion US-$ since 1995, and turnover has 
decreased in recent years. Notably, this 
stagnation began before MP3.comz, 
Napster and other filesharing systems 
enabled the free distribution of digital 
music. 
Traditionally, the music industry's 
business models have been tied to ma-
terial cultural goods, such as vinyl re-
cords, CDs or DVDs. Other modes of 
distribution and consumption repre-
sent mixed economies: collecting so-
cieties (e.g. the German Verwertungs-
gemeinschaft Wort) control and licence 
certain performance rights and distrib-
ute the fees on copying machines and 
media. This involves certain redistribu-
tions and consolidations into lump 
sums which reduce transaction costs 
and sometimes privilege smaller pro-
ducers over larger ones (Kretschmer 
2005). Mass media distribute music 
without separate fees and generate 
and distribute audiences' attention. 
Users have their own ways of distribut-
ing and exchanging music: In school 
playgrounds and friendship networks 
people exchange copies and compila-
tions and evaluate musicians.  
The mixed-economic value-and-use-
chain thus can be described as follows 
(see fig. 1): the creation of music, the 
writing, composing and performing 
happens mostly in relations which are 
not purely for-profit. Indeed, the ma-
jority of musicians subsidise their mu-
sic from teaching or performing (Kret-
schmer 2005). The production and dis-
tribution of music are commercial ac-
tivities – though they may be cross-
financed as in media broadcasting. 
Users buy music, but a large share of 
distribution and consumption takes 
place outside of the economy and in 
social exchange (Haug/Weber 2002). 
The archiving of music is a mixed 
economy as well: broadcasting com-
panies' archives are publicly subsi-
dised, record companies' archives are 
private, and the Internet as a music 
archive is non-profit or cross-
subsidised.  
The technological possibilities of the 
Internet and the diffusion of advanced 
copying, data compression and distri-
bution technologies to private house-
holds now endanger the music indus-
try's business model as soon as music 
can be distributed digitally and users 
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themselves are able to store it on di-
verse media. Users can thus multiply 
and globalise their practices of ex-
changing and listening to music. Crea-
tors also have gained options: the tra-
ditional countercultural scenario of 
"eliminating the middle man" and 
bringing audiences and artists into 
direct interaction has gained plausibil-
ity again (Dolfsma 2000; Kasaras 
2002). However, beyond free distribu-
tion there is still a lack of models for 
business and culture which allow for 
the fair and viable compensation of 
artists.  
Another question is how the actual 
functions of intermediaries such as the 
music industry and media are going to 
change: they provide capital and at-
tract and distribute attention and repu-
tation. It is conceivable that beside the 
grassroots activities of music enthusi-
asts, clubs and music magazines or 
radio stations will take over more or 
less commercial distributive activities. 
The question is whether this will take 
place with or without the traditional 
music industry.  
In a study of the music industry based 
on interviews with experts from the 
major labels, collecting societies and 
industry associations between 1996 
and 1999, these actors were still quite 
confident facing digitalisation and 
Internet distribution (Kretschmer et al. 
1999; 2001). They felt safe in their cen-
tral position and expected to be able to 
develop digital distribution slowly. 
They wanted to avoid a 'cannibalisa-
tion' of the music market with its com-
fortable profits, to maintain their con-
trol over 'content' and its distribution 
and to build platforms in co-operation 
with large Internet service providers 
(ISP). The Internet was seen as a "pro-
motion medium and mail order ma-
chine" (managers quoted from Kret-
schmer et al. 2001: 427) – and this 
view has been dominant until today.  
However, the advantages of a cheap 
distribution medium, in which the cen-
tral investments in bandwidth and 
storage technologies were made by 
users and ISPs, were attractive to the 
industry as well. When Bertelsmann's 
Thomas Middelhoff bought up Nap-
ster, for example, the strategy was to 
turn the 37 million Napster users into 
paying customers for unspecified ser-
vices – a vision which may have been 
overoptimistic in the new economy 
boom but must have looked commer-
cially irresistible to a company like 
Bertelsmann whose global success had 
traditionally been based on exclusive 
distribution channels. The conversion 
of Napster failed due to the other ma-
jor labels' risk aversion and to Nap-
ster's limited development capacities 
(cf. Röttgers 2003).  
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After Napster, the music industry 
chiefly reacted defensively to the new 
technological challenges along the 
lines of their 1990s strategies: file-
sharing networks such as Napster and 
MP3.com were bought up, copyright 
claims are legally enforced against 
ISPs and recently also against indi-
viduals, legislation is intensively and 
successfully lobbied to expand copy-
right, media campaigns are launched 
and CDs are technically protected 
against copying. Digital rights man-
agement (DRM) is gaining significance, 
i.e. the development of copying protec-
tion for potentially all digital informa-
tion goods. DRM makes it possible to 
differentiate the ways of using digital 
goods such as listening, transferring 
files to different devices, and storing 
files on a CD, and to separately ac-
count for these uses (see Lessig 2001; 
Halderman 2002). Beyond the techni-
cal-legal limitation of distribution, new 
business models develop rather slowly: 
in the US, Apple's iTunes presents a 
quite successful combination of hard-
ware and music subscription. In 
Europe the existing download websites 
so far are suffering from high prices, 
small assortments and a lack of 
agreements with collecting societies. 
Record companies but also radio sta-
tions and specialists distributing 
sounds for mobile phones set their 
future hopes in subscription models 
and mobile services.4 
All these models no longer try to suc-
ceed in existing markets. In order to 
achieve market success, companies try 
to strategically configure new ensem-
bles of organisations, products, pricing 
arrangements, regulations and cus-
tomers. However, these strategies are 
countered by users' distributed and 
hedonistic practices, and increasingly 
users, communication scientists, art-
ists and new social movements are 
developing some public voice in copy-
right issues. They assert the right to 
                                                       
4 www.heise.de/newsticker/ 
meldung/55442 
"private copying" (www.privatkopie. 
net), demand access to a public do-
main of freely available music that 
should be funded through a "cultural 
flat fee" for unlimited copying (www. 
fairsharing.de), and develop new li-
cencing models 
(www.creativecommons.org). In these 
debates about the boundaries of intel-
lectual property and the public do-
main, not just innovation models but 
also norms of creativity, public spheres 
and the free circulation of knowledge 
come to the fore – although there is 
often some confusion between public 
goods and consumerism.  
In this context it appears that the in-
dustry strategy that aims to fortify the 
traditional business model legally and 
technologically is likely to generate its 
own innovation blockade. Market ac-
tors dealing in licences, reputation or 
cultural images necessarily depend on 
cultural and institutional norms be-
yond the market. Although they seek 
to influence these and to increase their 
strategic options in the process, con-
tinuing strategies of the past and 
adapting the institutional environment 
to these strategies may lead to coun-
terproductive lock-ins of technologi-
cally enforced property rights that are 
contrary to cultural innovation.  
3.2 Scientific publishing 
In contrast to the market-based music 
industry, science traditionally repre-
sents the ideal-typical public domain 
that Merton has described as "commu-
nist": "The substantive findings of sci-
ence are a product of social collabora-
tion and are assigned to the commu-
nity. ... The scientist's claim to 'his' in-
tellectual 'property' is limited to that of 
recognition and esteem." (Merton 
1973: 273) 
The roles and functions of performer 
and audience5 within the social system 
                                                       
5 In the wide sense of Stichweh's "Leis-
tungs- und Publikumsrollen" (Stichweh 
1988). 
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of science are fluid and the close 
interaction desired by cultural avant-
gardes is potentially real here. The 
exchange currency is academic 
reputation. 
While theoretically scientific publishing 
thus creates and maintains a public 
domain, practically this domain is 
rather more patch-worked (Willinsky 
2002). The creation of academic publi-
cations as knowledge goods is part of 
the research process, which is funded 
publicly to a large extent (fig. 2). The 
physical production of scientific publi-
cations is a commercial activity, al-
though academics and their assistants 
have taken over the pre-press work. 
Distribution through booksellers is 
commercial, while distribution through 
public libraries is publicly funded, and 
libraries also take over archiving. Ar-
chiving is, however, complemented by 
the information retrieval that libraries 
and both commercial and publicly 
funded data bases provide. 
The exploitation of digital content and 
meta-information, such as databases 
and the just-in-time access to full text, 
is the domain of commercial services 
(Becker/Bickel 1992), i.e. scientific 
publishers who have become compre-
hensive information providers. Librar-
ies offer access to the databases they 
subscribe to, and their networks and 
document delivery services come to 
resemble commercial providers in their 
business models (Kuhlen 2001). On the 
other hand, commercial publishers 
often offer abstracts and tables of con-
tents for free through the Internet in 
such a way that, again, free distribu-
tion of limited information generates 
attention and demand for digital 
goods.   
Considering the scarce public funds for 
libraries, the business models of pub-
lishers and data base providers, and 
the sheer volume of scientific publica-
tions, the ensemble of non-profit pro-
duction and information provision 
through libraries on the one hand, and 
commercial duplication, distribution 
and value-added services on the other, 
has fallen into the so-called 'journal 
crisis'. In Germany, from 1991 to 1997 
the funds of university libraries have 
increased by 1.3% per year while the 
prices for journals in the humanities 
have been raised by 27% and in the 
sciences by 77% (Nentwich 2001: 24).  
The sustainability of this institutional 
arrangement becomes more question-
able considering that the actual au-
thors of scientific publications have 
hardly any share in the profits that 
accrue from the commodification of 
their production. They confer copyright 
to publishers, invest work into pre-
press preparation, and may even sub-
sidise publication (in the case of books 
in Germany). In return, "universities 
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need to devote ever larger shares of 
their library budgets to buying back 
their faculty's material previously given 
to the publishers" (Nentwich 2001: 22). 
For these, especially the large ones, 
this business is rather profitable: El-
sevier Science&Medical in 2003 re-
ported 2002 million € of business vol-
ume and 677 million € operating 
profit.6 
For these reasons, the division be-
tween commercial and non-profit ac-
tivities is likely to change. Print or 
print-and-digital publishing of tradi-
tional journals are supplemented by 
document servers and disciplinary 
internet platforms. Academics and re-
search institutions use the Internet in 
combination with search engines to 
make working papers or published 
articles globally accessible in ways that 
bring formalised scientific communica-
tion closer to the informal one of con-
ferences and talk. These practices dif-
fer along the lines of the communica-
tion and publishing habits of disci-
plines and communities. The contex-
tuality and half-life periods of scientific 
results and the relative significance of 
conferences versus journals play a part 
here (Nentwich 2003). 
Currently, a range of library networks, 
professional associations and grass-
roots initiatives are working on open 
archives,7 standards for electronic 
publishing and on rules for bringing 
published work back into the public 
domain (Sietmann 2002). In Germany, 
the DFG (German Research Founda-
tion) and the BMBF (Federal Ministry 
for Education and Research) fund the 
development of public science plat-
                                                       
6 www.reedelsevier.com/media/power-
point/m/1/FINALpresentationforwebsite.pdf 
7 For physics, mathematics and computer 
science, there is the pre-print server 
www.arxiv.org in Los Alamos (Grötschel 
2002). www.openarchives.org has devel-
oped a standard for open archives, the Bu-
dapest open Access Initiative (www.soros. 
org/openaccess) promotes free access to 
academic publications on the Internet. 
forms, pre-print-servers and decentral-
ised forums (Wissenschaftsrat 2001; 
BMBF 2002). The DFG-funded project 
GAP (German Academic Publishers) is 
developing a platform for electronic 
journals and book publication. Krause 
and Schmiede (2004) give an overview 
of German developments in the social 
sciences.  
For these reasons, Michael Nentwich 
(2003) already sees the variety of ini-
tiatives and projects as indicative of a 
phase 3 of re-de-commodified scien-
tific publishing after the phase of the 
public domain and the phase of com-
modification. I suppose that, at least in 
some disciplines, the path-dependency 
of the traditional structures may be 
rather stronger. There is no reason 
why the mechanisms of peer-review 
should not be transferable to elec-
tronic and openly accessible media. 
Yet, currently the distribution of aca-
demic reputation is tied to established 
journals and hence, commodified dis-
tribution. The generation of strategi-
cally important meta-information such 
as the measuring of impact factors and 
ranking of these journals is largely 
dominated by commercial companies. 
Even an increase of this path-
dependency is likely if academic 
evaluation mechanisms and indicators 
(Hornbostel 1997) diffuse in such ways 
that they give additional weight to the 
"old" agencies of reputation.  
3.3 Market and technology in the in-
formation society – recent 
changes in copyright 
The current amendments to copyright 
law in Germany as elsewhere aim at a 
fortification and extension of intellec-
tual property rights, and they tend to 
assimilate new technology to estab-
lished forms of distribution. The cen-
tral regulations for the fields analysed 
here are private copying, technical 
copying protection and the so-called 
"science barrier", i.e. the rules of fair 
scientific use.  
In general, in spite of all the negotia-
tions and compromises in the process 
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of legislation, the amendments follow 
mostly the interest and strategies of 
large commercial actors and thus pre-
scribe the predominance of markets 
and property rights as opposed to an 
expansion of the public domain. How-
ever, some formulations leave a range 
of ambiguities to jurisdiction and to 
everyday practice.  
The regulation of private copying al-
lows limited numbers of reproductions 
for non-commercial purposes. Such 
reproductions are generally legal, but 
with a view to file-sharing networks 
one exception has been introduced: 
copies are legal "unless an obviously 
illegally produced master copy is used 
for reproduction"8 (§ 53 (1), sentence 1 
UrhG). Even for legal copies, "effective" 
(§ 95a) technological protection meas-
ures must not be circumvented. De-
vices to avoid or circumvent copy pro-
tection are outlawed, i.e. they may nei-
ther be used nor distributed.  
Here, the technological defense 
against copyright infringements or 
more generally, against uses that are 
contrary to the will of the copyright 
holder, gains legal protection. This 
means that law is not simply replaced 
by code, as Lawrence Lessig stated 
(1999), but the law protects techno-
logical copy protection. Intentionally 
or unintentionally, it privileges those 
future business models that enhance 
the logic of increased monopolisation 
and control of consumers as described 
by Brödner et al. (1981) or Boyle 
(2000). For example, Digital Rights 
Management systems enable a division 
of uses which may be paid for differen-
tially ("pay-per-use", with different fees 
for listening to music, recording it, or 
transferring it to other devices), and in 
order to implement this, they need to 
control users tightly. On the other 
hand, the law's formulations of "obvi-
ously" illegal copies and "effective" 
protection measures are legally diffuse 
                                                       
8 "sofern nicht zur Vervielfältigung eine 
offensichtlich rechtswidrig hergestellte 
Vorlage verwendet wird" 
and leave the actual evaluation of up- 
and downloading or copying to users 
and the courts. Consequently, users' 
actual obligations to check the legality 
of master copies are controversial. 
Well aware of these imprecisions, both 
associations of culture industries and 
the Ministry of Justice seek to influ-
ence users' interpretations through 
public media campaigns. The code and 
the law (Lessig) are surrounded and in 
fact socially implemented through 
public discourses and images that are 
shaped by the actors in the field. The 
film industry (www.hartabergerecht. 
de) symbolically presents downloading 
as a criminal activity (and in fact over-
states the legal sanctions), while the 
ministry (www.kopien-brauchen-origi-
nale.de) draws on everyday transposi-
tions of icons of popular culture to 
claim that copies require originals.  
In the field of science, a new fair-use 
rule has been established in § 52a 
UrhG, which, however, is set to expire 
by the end of 2006. It permits making 
small parts of a published work, small 
works or single newspaper articles 
available for teaching and recently also 
for research purposes. The public to 
whom such material is made available 
is, however, restricted to a delimited 
circle of researchers or students, i.e. a 
technologically circumscribed user 
group, and fees need to be paid to col-
lecting societies.  
In the second legislative package (BMJ 
2004) this is made more concrete and 
the previous copyright barriers are 
drawn tighter. Here, a range of the 
technological possibilities of digital 
distribution is reserved for commercial 
distributors. If a library has digital 
works, these may only be read elec-
tronically inside the respective library, 
and not in more copies than the library 
has paid for. Electronic document de-
livery services may only deliver journal 
articles or parts of works by mail, fax 
or as a graphic file, i.e. not as a text file 
which can easily be processed further. 
Such delivery is permitted only if "the 
articles or small parts of works cannot 
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be acquired by members of the public 
at times and locations of their choice 
by a contractual arrangement" (BMJ 
2004: § 53a (1), sentence 2, translation 
UH). This privileges the document sup-
ply by commercial databases over the 
supply through libraries.  
Academic associations have voiced 
their concern over drastic cost in-
creases and increasing inequality in 
the provision of scientific information.9 
For libraries, this implies that their 
function in the provision and archival 
storage of information tends to be re-
stricted to a basic supply, which legally 
transfers the physical limitations of 
paper copies to electronic information. 
In the use of new technology, the mar-
ket is privileged over the public sector 
– while on the other hand, the state 
funds electronic public domains, open 
archives and electronic publishing. 
 
4 Discussion and conclusions  
4.1 Digital music and digital science 
If we compare the relationship be-
tween markets and non-market distri-
bution in the fields of music and sci-
ence, the technological possibilities 
have been used in the contrary direc-
tions of commodification and de-
commodification. In the field of music, 
users in alliance with the IT industry 
have quickly integrated the options of 
digitally obtaining, distributing and 
playing music into cultural everyday 
practices. For a long time the music 
industry has had little success in at-
tempting to integrate possible value 
added into their business models, and 
is now trying to legally enforce and 
technologically fortify their intellectual 
property rights. Other players such as 
IT companies (e.g. Apple) or specialist 
start-ups that distribute, for example, 
music for mobile phones (Jamba) have 
been more successful in innovating 
products and services and in shaping 
                                                       
9 www.heise.de/newsticker/ 
meldung/51961. 
consumers' practices of music recep-
tion. For the music industry, however, 
the empirical relationship of intellec-
tual property and the public domain 
and the perception of that relationship 
by relevant actors takes the shape of a 
zero-sum game: Gnutella or DRM, free 
distribution or commodification. 
In science, large commercial publish-
ers have been able to realise digital 
value-added from an early point in 
time, and scientific databases have 
been developed rather earlier than the 
Internet. Actors from the fields of sci-
ence and public libraries have only 
recently begun to re-emphasise the 
norms and self-descriptions of a public 
domain, and to develop its technologi-
cal foundations. Here we find mixed 
and heterogeneous economies and 
practices of use.  
The uses of digital goods and the insti-
tutions of intellectual property thus are 
developing in contradictory ways and 
in close interaction with the norms, 
practices, strategies and path-
dependencies in their respective fields. 
Consequently, the music industry faces 
a crisis of demand and science a crisis 
of supply in their respective digital 
goods.  
But why is it that large and global aca-
demic publishers have been able to 
position themselves so much more 
successfully in their market of digital 
goods than the major music industry 
labels? Or: why have computer users, 
teenagers and students been able to 
implement faster and more economical 
modes of distributing digital goods in 
their cultural everyday practices than 
professional knowledge workers, who 
are also normatively committed to the 
public domain?  
From different theoretical points of 
view, there are different reasons: look-
ing at users' incentives, the music 
market with its fairly expensive CDs 
gave consumers a considerable incen-
tive to shift to free music distribution, 
while in publicly-funded science users 
do not pay the full price for their in-
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formation supply. On the demand side, 
the information work and attention 
required to absorb music are consid-
erably less than for reading scientific 
publications. Culturally and techno-
logically, the omnipresence of music 
has been extended from public spaces 
to individual media devices, while sci-
entific work is mostly situated in pro-
fessional research contexts, though 
these tend to de-spatialise. In terms of 
innovation theory, timing is signifi-
cant: the music industry appears to be 
suffering from its previous successes 
in digitalising music and realising high 
CD prices. Scientific publishers were 
able to establish value-added services 
on proprietary networks before the 
Internet offered an alternative.  
This comparison of widely contrasting 
fields looks temptingly deconstructive 
with regard to academic self-images. 
Indeed, in science, path-dependencies 
and possible lock-ins are found in the 
non-profit sphere. When the academic 
distribution of reputation became tied 
to commercial patterns of distribution, 
academics relied on libraries as media-
tors between both sides, which could 
be expected to maintain a Mertonian 
public domain. With the journal and 
library crisis, this public domain turns 
into an illusio in the sense of Bourdieu 
(1998: 110): by relying on the institu-
tionalised self-description of science 
as a public domain, the economic and 
social prerequisites of this domain and 
its maintenance moved out of focus as 
well as the existing exclusionary 
mechanisms. Academics disinterest-
edly took access to their own means of 
production for granted. In the author's 
view, the development of open access 
mechanisms and platforms could also 
do with some more institutional 
imagination. While a transfer of peer-
review mechanisms will be indispen-
sable in an era of wide-ranging per-
formance appraisal, its limitations (cf. 
Hirschauer 2004) suggest that there is 
room for experimentation with diverse, 
more transparent and open forms of 
evaluation.  
However, this comparative analysis 
gives merely a momentary picture. 
Considering the wide variety of digital 
initiatives in the sciences and humani-
ties, it is quite possible that academic 
publishers still will be "napsterised" 
(Kuhlen 2002; cf. Nentwich 2003). At 
any rate, we have to expect the emer-
gence of mixed economies and techno-
logically/socially/culturally hybrid 
modes of use and practice. 
Actors intending to profit from digital 
goods would be well advised not to 
concentrate on the legal and techno-
logical enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. More auspicious 
strategies would be to learn to cope 
with fluid boundaries and leaks be-
tween markets and public domains, to 
think about intelligent hybrids and 
modes of adding value and supporting 
creative practice and use. 
4.2 Conclusions for copyright and 
public domain politics 
These analyses of institutional fields 
have made clear that knowledge bases, 
digital goods, public domains and 
commodification processes are so het-
erogeneous that they cannot be de-
scribed as either a one-way process of 
commodification or as an unfolding of 
the productive forces of the knowledge 
society. As Stehr argues, an expansion 
of individuals' and small groups' 
capacity for creative action has been 
observed: it is possible to extend the 
social exchange of cultural goods and 
knowledge, as well as the enjoyment 
of music and professional communica-
tion. This has turned out to be tempo-
rarily easier for everyday consumption 
cultures than for scientific communi-
ties. The development of copyright, 
however, does not move in the direc-
tion of an extension of free and con-
text-unspecific access to digital goods.  
Although copyright does not draw 
simple boundaries between property 
rights and the public domain but gov-
erns their interrelation, it tends to en-
close property rights and contexts of 
use rather than opening them up. This 
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is obvious with the legal privilege for 
copy protection and commercial 
document delivery. With the fair scien-
tific use rule ("Wissenschaftsschranke") 
a not-quite-public domain is recog-
nised in a field where economically 
relevant contributions to innovation 
are expected, in universities and re-
search institutions. Users in this do-
main are to be technically configured 
as members of these organisations. If, 
however, the boundaries of the science 
system become more permeable to 
other social systems or contexts, if 
sciences and their applications move 
closer together, and if such processes 
and arenas are not to be reduced to 
markets, a legal delimitation of scien-
tific audiences and discourses appears 
counterproductive. 
While technically, the new copyright 
law requires libraries to restrict their 
information supply to paper-analogous 
forms of distribution, scientific com-
munities are required organizationally 
to restrict their audiences to formal-
ized membership roles. 
With the expansion and legal-technical 
fortification of intellectual property 
rights in the heterogeneous fields of 
knowledge and cultural production, 
specific modes of digital goods pro-
duction and specific powerful actors' 
strategies are privileged over others: 
commercial production that tends to 
address existing expectations and re-
ception modes of its market, small-
scale control of customers and users, 
passive consumption, secondary and 
multiple exploitation, and the concen-
tration of those content providers that 
are able to implement such strategies. 
These actors may expect increasing 
returns, which lead to monopolisation, 
path-dependency and lock-in, i.e. to 
an overdetermined convergence, ho-
mogenisation and ultra-stabilisation of 
existing technologies, contents and 
cultures (Callon 1994; Boyle 2000; Les-
sig 2001). Powerful actors who are 
further empowered in this way are 
quite capable of driving these proc-
esses by themselves, to increase fa-
vourable path-dependencies and ex-
tend their monopolies into the future.  
The changing copyright regime thus 
fails to support and even endangers 
avant-gardist, hybrid and everyday 
practices of producing and using cul-
tural and knowledge goods. These 
practices depend upon social ex-
changes beyond the market and are 
situated in between the delimited so-
cial spheres of science, culture and 
technology. Through the strategies 
pursued by commercial producers and 
exploiters of digital goods and through 
the short-termism, side-effects and 
unintended consequences of these 
strategies, the expansion of intellectual 
property rights may thus end up creat-
ing the very zero-sum situations be-
tween intellectual property and the 
public domain that we have challenged 
theoretically. 
On the other hand, when copyright 
issues first emerged, a network of NGO 
and social movement actors, academ-
ics and technologists has developed, 
which we might term a digital civil so-
ciety (cf. Kuhlen 2004) defending the 
public domain. For these, the public 
domain in its very non-specificity pre-
sents a useful normative focus to ad-
dress the non-market prerequisites of 
knowledge and culture: their creation 
and circulation. It also presents a Leit-
bild to develop and implement institu-
tional and social innovations: licences 
and models for distribution and use of 
digital goods that seek to balance and 
ally authors' and audiences' interests 
and norms in new ways. From an evo-
lutionary perspective on innovation, 
cultivating public spaces beyond mar-
kets means maintaining higher social 
variability and seedbeds of potential 
and alternative innovations (cf. Ram-
mert 1997). 
However, the experience of digital sci-
ence based on the Mertonian view 
contains a warning lesson for promot-
ers of the public domain: a normative 
over-commitment to the public do-
main as a generally good idea may end 
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up underrating the heterogeneous and 
also unequal practices and contexts in 
which digital goods are created and 
used.10 Attention to context-specific 
passions and interests and to the dy-
namics of inclusion and exclusion in 
the respective arenas of action will be 
conducive to a view that understands 
the public domain as a token for vari-
ability, open access and reflexive 
creativity. 
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Abstract 
Are national technology and innovation policies becoming obsolete under the con-
ditions of an increasing internationalization of science, technologies and industry? 
The paper supports the argument that despite globalization and Europeanization, 
national technology and innovation policies remain the most important and effec-
tive level of governance in this area of policy. The argument will be elaborated in 
four steps: firstly, the paper presents a brief overview of the discussions and con-
troversy concerning the future governance of technology and innovation policies. 
Secondly, the effects of changing general conditions on national policies are dis-
cussed, especially the policy implications of the development of new technologies, 
of the internationalization of industry and of the growing importance of public dis-
courses. Thirdly, the relations between the national and the European level of gov-
ernance are analyzed and an answer is given to the question why there has not 
been a significant shift of competencies and resources from the national to the 
European level until now. Against this background and with a special view regard-
ing the German case, the paper finally analyses strategic reorientations, new ele-
ments and instruments of the national technology and innovation policy and dis-
cusses their impact on science, industry, and society. 
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1 Discussions and controversies: 
Globalization, multi-level gov-
ernance and the remaining role 
of national policies 
For a long time major objectives of 
national technology and innovation 
policies have included strengthening 
technological competitiveness, sup-
porting technologies and promoting 
innovation activities on the territory 
that is controlled. And they are still at 
work. In Germany as well as in other 
leading countries, national policy ef-
forts are strongly focused on the aim 
“to enable Germany to hold its own 
against the competition of other lead-
ing technology regions of the world.” 
(BMBF 2000: 14-15) However, are na-
tional policies still able to call the 
tune? What remains of national politi-
cal capabilities to stimulate or shape 
technologies, innovation activities, 
infrastructures and institutions under 
conditions of an increasing interna-
tionalization of knowledge, technolo-
gies and industries?  
In Germany, since the early 1990s 
these questions have been discussed 
mainly in the field of political science 
(see Grimmer et al. 1992; Martin-
sen/Simonis 1995; Gerybadze et al. 
1997; Grimmer et al. 1999; Simonis et 
al. 2001; Grande 2001). The debate 
began with a paradigm shift. The 
conception of a coherent and inter-
vening state with regard to economy 
and society and with this the idea that 
the state could shape or steer 
technological progress (Hauff/Scharpf 
1975) was empirically proven wrong 
(Simonis 1992; Meyer-Krahmer 1999). 
Instead since then three different ar-
guments have been widely acknowl-
edged: 
Firstly, it has been recognized that the 
state is only one player in the technol-
ogy and innovation process among 
other relevant actors. Moreover, it has 
been shown that political decision-
making systematically depends on ex-
ternal expertise and negotiations with 
powerful private actors especially from 
industry and science. Therefore the 
idea of an autonomous and directing 
state was replaced by various concepts 
of a cooperative, interactive, learning 
or negotiating state. 
Secondly, it has been emphasized that 
political authorities are not able to 
plan or steer technologies or innova-
tion activities but instead at best are 
able to provide general conditions and 
‘soft’ incentives for multiple self-
organized and self-interested groups 
of actors. Therefore the idea of an ac-
tive and intervening technology and 
innovation policy was rejected in favor 
of new modes and instruments con-
cerning a more indirect stimulation of 
innovation activities, infrastructural 
and institutional change. 
Thirdly, it has been stressed that the 
complexity of policy-making itself has 
increased significantly over the past 
two decades. Because of Europeaniza-
tion (and regionalization too) national 
technology and innovation policies 
have lost their exclusiveness in the 
policy-making system in favor of an 
emerging multi-level system of gov-
ernance. Therefore the focus of analy-
sis has shifted from national policies 
to the patterns of Europeanization and 
the multi-layer structure of this policy 
field. 
However, behind these stylized facts 
there are still controversial points. This 
concerns especially the two related 
questions which will be discussed in 
this paper. 
The first one deals with the distribu-
tion of resources and competencies 
within the scope of the multi-level sys-
tem of governance. Is the gradual Eu-
ropeanization of innovation and regu-
latory policy activities undermining or 
replacing policies carried out at the 
national level? Or does the nation state 
remain the indispensable and domi-
nant arena of policy activities? (see the 
discussions in Kuhlmann 2001; Edler 
et al. 2003; Edler/Kuhlmann 2005) Or, 
to put it into a normative question: is a 
“much stronger, more focused and 
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integrated policy for industry and 
technology” in the European Union 
necessary to fulfill the conditions of 
globalization and to consolidate 
Europe’s competitiveness in the global 
technology race? (Chesnais et al. 2000: 
249; see also EU-Commission 2000) Or 
is the technological competitiveness of 
Europe even today mainly based on 
the national capabilities, infrastruc-
tures and institutions of their leading 
countries? 
If this last question is answered in the 
affirmative a second tier of questions 
arises concerning the remaining lee-
ways and capabilities of policy-making 
at the national level itself. Does the 
internationalization of knowledge, 
technologies, markets and industrial 
activities lead to a convergence or dis-
solution of national innovation sys-
tems and to a substantial decline or 
erosion of nation states’ capacities in 
technology and innovation policy? 
(Willke 2001; Grande 1994, 2001b; 
Ohmae 1990; Cairncross 1997) Or do 
there remain variations across coun-
tries in innovation, production and 
political systems as well as in national 
innovation policies indispensable in 
providing opportunities, infrastruc-
tures and institutions rendering the 
country attractive for science and in-
dustry? (Porter 1989; Nelson 1993; 
Mowery/Nelson 1999, Archibugi/Iam-
marino 1999)  
The main argument of this paper is 
that national technology and innova-
tion policy is not becoming obsolete. 
National systems of innovation with 
significant differences in technological 
specialization, markets, infrastructures 
and institutions remain the most im-
portant level of innovation activities 
even in the era of globalization. More-
over, national policies especially of the 
large European member states (and 
the US as well) aim at strengthening 
their own technological and economic 
competitiveness in rivalry with other 
countries. This sets limits both to the 
emergence of a European system of 
innovation and the European integra-
tion process in this area. Of course, to 
face the challenges of internationaliza-
tion and to remain functioning, new 
adjustments of national technology 
and innovation policies are necessary. 
They have to open up, learn from and 
adapt to other countries and develop 
new systemic concepts and instru-
ments of policy-making. 
The paper argues along these lines in 
three steps. The following chapter dis-
cusses the effects of changing general 
conditions on the leeways and capa-
bilities of national policies, especially 
the policy implications of the devel-
opment of a new set of core technolo-
gies, of the internationalization of in-
dustry and of the growing importance 
of a watchful and headstrong public. In 
the third chapter the division of com-
petencies between the national and the 
European level of governance will be 
analyzed and the question will be an-
swered, whether there is a significant 
shift of competencies and resources 
from the national to the European 
level or not. Against this background 
and with a special look at the German 
case, the paper will finally sketch stra-
tegic reorientations, new concepts and 
instruments of national technology 
and innovation policy and discuss their 
capability to influence and stimulate 
innovation activities as well as infra-
structural and institutional change. 
 
2 Contexts: Fluid technologies, 
international economy, watch-
ful public and changing gov-
ernance 
To get an impression of the challenges 
technology and innovation policies are 
being faced with, it seems above all 
necessary to work out major changes 
in technology, economy, public per-
ception and governance during the last 
two decades and to sketch their reper-
cussions on policy-making. 
2.1 Fluid technologies 
The portfolio of core technologies has 
changed fundamentally. Since the 
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1980s new information and communi-
cation technologies have transformed 
the entire economy and ultimately the 
rest of society as well. Moreover, ge-
netic engineering, life sciences and 
nanotechnologies are gaining in im-
portance. 
The characteristics of these new cross-
sectoral core technologies, which at 
present dominate the dynamics of in-
novation and sociotechnical change, 
differ from those of established large 
technologies or large technological 
systems (such as nuclear energy, air-
craft and space technologies, and elec-
tricity systems) in many respects. Typi-
cal features of these technologies are 
(Dolata 1992, 2003) 
o their dynamic and fluid state: they 
develop fast, have wide-ranging 
and cross-sectoral potential appli-
cations but are often extremely 
uncertain concerning the direction 
they are going; 
o their often decentralized and 
fragmentary character: different 
from large technologies they 
emerge in countless areas and 
places, are promoted by a large 
number of different actors and can 
be used in numerous contexts; 
o their science-based and multi-
disciplinary profile: they are often 
knowledge-based and interdisci-
plinary and call for intensive col-
laborations both within industry 
and between industry and acade-
mia; 
o the absence of state intervention: 
they are promoted mainly by en-
terprises, scientific institutions, in-
dustrial networks and through co-
operations between industry and 
academia – self-organized patterns 
of development without direct par-
ticipation of state authorities are 
the rule; 
o their international performance: 
the patterns of innovation, coop-
eration and competition are inter-
nationally interwoven. 
These characteristics of new core 
technologies have considerable conse-
quences for policy-making. The direct 
influence of the state on the dizzy dy-
namics and further pathways of these 
complex and small-sized new tech-
nologies is low. They are different from 
large technologies, because the state is 
not necessary as an indispensable in-
vestor, guarantor or customer. More-
over, the state is no longer only faced 
with a small number of well-known 
industrial or scientific actors. Instead it 
has to deal with multiple heterogene-
ous actors and numerous self-
organized and -governed networks of 
innovators (Freeman 1991; Rammert 
1997). 
Under these conditions of private self-
organization and uncertainty all kinds 
of innovation policy activities – rang-
ing from public research programs, 
institutional restructuring of public 
research and incentives to support the 
innovation efforts of firms to regional 
initiatives and regulatory policy – can-
not be developed by an autonomous 
and implemented by a directing state. 
Instead, policy-making of state au-
thorities is more than ever systemati-
cally dependent on the external exper-
tise and competencies of private actors 
which are at the head of the innova-
tion process. A major new challenge in 
this respect is how the competencies 
and resources of new actors (e.g. start-
up companies) can be integrated into 
the already existing patterns of private-
public consultation and corporatist 
decision-making between state au-
thorities, industry and science. 
2.2 International economy 
Moreover, technology and innovation 
policies are faced with considerable 
changes in the patterns of industrial 
innovation activities. In monetary 
terms, an average of 70% of the overall 
research and development in the 
OECD countries is carried out by in-
dustry (BMBF 2004: 489). Three new 
trends are particularly remarkable and 
have significant repercussions on pol-
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icy-making: the step-by-step interna-
tionalization of industrial innovation 
activities, the growing importance of 
technology-based cooperations and 
the rise of new start-up companies as 
catalysts of the innovation process.  
Above all the internationalization of 
companies’ innovation activities has 
significantly increased during the past 
two decades. This trend is most re-
markable in new high-technologies 
(like biotechnology and pharmacy, 
computer, semiconductor and infor-
mation technologies). By now, German 
companies, for instance, spend more 
than a fourth of their overall research 
and development (R&D) budgets 
abroad. Actually, the exceptionally in-
ternationalized German chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals industry invests 
nearly half of their R&D-budget in for-
eign countries. Other large-scale en-
terprises like Siemens or Daimler 
Chrysler do so too (Belitz 2004: 18-25; 
BMBF 2002a: 123-138) What is typical 
of these companies is that they no 
longer carry out only subordinate de-
velopment activities in foreign coun-
tries. Instead they have begun to real-
ize leading-edge research in company-
owned R&D-centers abroad – research 
activities that formerly were highly 
concentrated in their home country 
(Gerybadze et al. 1997; Hack 1998; 
Dolata 1996). However, internationali-
zation doesn’t mean indiscriminate 
globalization, as Ohmae (1990), Cairn-
cross (1997) or Willke (2001) have sug-
gested. Companies don’t allocate their 
R&D-activities evenly and everywhere 
but concentrate them worldwide in a 
few leading regions or districts which 
are close to scientific excellence and 
(future) lead markets (Feldman 1994; 
Patel 1995; Heng/Schaaf 2002; Carls-
son/Mudambi 2003). Instead of a loca-
tionless globalization very selective 
and a regionally concentrated patterns 
of internationalization are characteris-
tic of industrial R&D and innovation 
activities.  
A second remarkable trend of the 
1990s is the rapid increase of collabo-
rations both within industry and be-
tween industry and academia – espe-
cially in new high technologies. At the 
top of the trend is the pharmaceuticals 
industry. Today the large companies of 
this industrial sector spend between 25 
and 30% of their research budgets on 
the support of external cooperations, 
whereas until the 1980s the same 
companies realized their research ac-
tivities nearly exclusively in-house 
(Dolata 2003: 175-243). The systematic 
constraint towards cooperation results 
from the extraordinary dynamics of the 
generation of knowledge, the fast rate 
of technological change and the multi-
disciplinarity of research and devel-
opment projects. These complex pat-
terns of innovation are, even in large 
enterprises, impossible to handle 
purely by in-house capacities (Hage-
doorn 1996; Hagedoorn et al. 2000; 
OECD 2000). Besides the expansion of 
company-owned capacities and capa-
bilities (Pavitt/Patel 1999), they require 
the simultaneous recourse to com-
pany-external knowledge, know-how 
and competencies. Therefore today 
“the locus of innovation will be found 
in networks of learning, rather than in 
individual firms.” (Powell et al. 1996: 
116; also Freeman 1991) 
A third new trend has to be added. Be-
sides large enterprises small and re-
search-intensive start-up companies 
have been established as pioneers, 
brain trusts and driving forces of the 
innovation process and the early 
commercialization of new technologies 
– not only in the U.S., but during the 
1990s also in Western Europe. The 
personal computer and its operating 
systems, the early commercialization 
of genetic engineering, and the inter-
net, for instance, all got under way not 
by saturated large enterprises but by 
new entrants (Ichbiah/Knepper 1991; 
Dolata 1996; Mowery/Nelson 1999; 
BRIE-IGCC E-conomy Project 2001). As 
venturesome, research-intensive and 
unconventional operating units they 
stimulate not only the innovation 
process itself, but at the same time 
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have become important external re-
sources and cooperators for big indus-
try, even though the bulk of the entire 
industrial R&D expenses still falls to 
large enterprises – in Germany ap-
proximately 80% (Legler et al. 2004: 
15-24) – and only very few start-up 
companies conduct leading-edge re-
search and turn out to be commer-
cially successful innovators (Parker 
1999).  
Altogether these trends – internation-
alization, collaboration and the emer-
gence of new industrial actors – have 
considerable impact on the outline of 
technology and innovation policies. 
The formerly close connection be-
tween domestic enterprises, the na-
tional development of technologies 
and national policies has opened up. 
The addressees of national policy ini-
tiatives are no longer exclusively the 
well-known national champions and 
the medium-sized enterprises at home. 
Instead the state has to provide gen-
eral conditions and incentives that are 
attractive for increasingly internation-
ally operating domestic companies as 
well as for foreign enterprises which 
intend to invest in the respective coun-
try. Moreover, it has to develop new 
incentives that aim at supporting the 
emergence and stabilization of new 
start-up firms. And finally, it has to 
recognize that today the locus of inno-
vation will be found “in the interstices 
between firms, universities, research 
laboratories, suppliers, and custom-
ers” (Powell et al. 1996: 118) and 
therefore has to promote initiatives 
designed to stimulate cooperative ar-
rangements and networking as well as 
technology transfer from academia to 
industry.  
The pattern of a highly selective and 
regionally clustered internationaliza-
tion of companies’ research and inno-
vation activities not only interweaves 
national (and regional) locations closer 
than ever before but at the same time 
places them into fierce competition 
and rivalry. Under these conditions, 
nation states are under pressure to 
compete with each other and struggle 
for locational decisions and invest-
ments of both domestic and foreign 
enterprises and scientists, too (Jessop 
2002). For this purpose above all, they 
have to offer excellent research condi-
tions, sophisticated innovation infra-
structures and prosperous lead mar-
kets to companies. 
2.3 Sensitive public 
During the last two decades the public 
perception and use of new technolo-
gies has changed too. Starting with the 
fierce protest against nuclear energy, 
almost every new technology has been 
perceived ambivalently and has been 
widely discussed in public. Moreover, 
the end user make use of the opportu-
nities of new technologies often in a 
headstrong and unexpected way 
(Bauer 1995; Bauer/Gaskell 2002). 
In contrast to the 1970s and 1980s, 
today public unease concerning new 
technologies is not only spurred on by 
well-organized protest movements, 
non-governmental organizations and 
environmental and consumer associa-
tions but is increasingly expressed by 
collective actors which are non-
organized and hardly ever institution-
alized, such as citizens, voters and 
consumers. They remain unimportant 
as long as they do not develop shared 
user preferences or problem percep-
tions concerning new technologies. 
But if so, they are no longer only pas-
sive addressees of new technological 
supplies but instead can exercise con-
siderable influence on the design and 
portfolio of new products as well as on 
public policy (Dolata 2003: 31-33). 
On the one hand collective actors do 
appear as headstrong users and selec-
tive consumers. This is the case with 
many new everyday applications of 
media, information and communica-
tion technologies. Often final custom-
ers and users exert an influence on 
new technological supplies by using 
them very selectively or contrary to all 
expectations. This can lead both to 
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failure or (sometimes unexpected) suc-
cess of new products (Kubicek 1997). 
On the other hand, collective actors 
can also be skeptical, watchful citizens 
and discerning consumers, the major-
ity of which may not accept new tech-
nologies or specific applications. This 
is for instance partially the case with 
genetic engineering, especially with 
new applications in agriculture and the 
food industry (Hampel/Renn 1999).  
These opportunities of public interven-
tion do not only have repercussions on 
the strategies of certain industries, 
they can also put political authorities 
under pressure. Public policy is not 
only forced to create initiatives and 
incentives which aim at strengthening 
countries’ economic and technological 
competitiveness, it is at the same time 
faced with an enlightened public which 
no longer accepts technological pro-
gress in general but discusses and 
sometimes refuses new technologies. 
Therefore, policy has also to develop 
new modes of mediation of social con-
troversies concerning new technolo-
gies. It has to ensure transparency, 
safety, consumer protection and par-
ticipation as well. 
2.4 Multi-level governance 
Finally, the architecture of innovation 
policy-making itself has also changed. 
Since the early 1980s the most re-
markable new development in this re-
spect has been the gradual formation 
of an original European technology, 
innovation and regulatory policy. Since 
then, national policy initiatives have 
been increasingly supplemented by 
and partly intertwined with corre-
sponding activities of the European 
Union. The formerly unchallenged 
dominance and exclusiveness of na-
tional authorities and policies has 
been restricted in favor of a co-
evolution and co-existence of different 
levels of innovation policy making.  
What does co-evolution and co-
existence mean? Are we witnessing an 
intensified European integration and a 
significant shift of governance and pol-
icy-making from the national to the 
European level? Or can we observe 
only loose combinations of fragmented 
levels of governance in which national 
policies and arenas still play the domi-
nant role? To answer this first tier of 
questions I will now analyze the dy-
namics, scope and breadth of Euro-
pean integration in the field of innova-
tion and regulatory policy and give 
reasons for the argument that the na-
tional level of policy-making still re-
mains the most important one. 
 
3 Architectures: European Inte-
gration, National Systems of 
Innovation and International 
Rivalries 
3.1 European Integration? 
Without doubt the European Commu-
nity has reached a new level of gov-
ernance and the Commission of the 
European Communities has been es-
tablished as a new and important actor 
in technology, innovation and regula-
tory policy during the past two dec-
ades. This has happened mainly in two 
areas: in the development of legal 
frameworks for research, production 
and commercialization of new tech-
nologies, and in the implementation of 
European programs for research and 
technological development. Moreover, 
with the recent approach “Towards a 
European research area” launched in 
2000, the Commission started a new 
attempt to coordinate European, na-
tional and regional innovation policies 
in a better way (European Commission 
2000). 
Responsibilities for the set up of legal 
frameworks and regulations of tech-
nologies have shifted heavily from the 
national to the European level since 
the late 1980s. Meanwhile, the deci-
sions concerning legal and regulatory 
aspects take place mainly at the Euro-
pean level – and are reflected in a 
whole string of relevant initiatives, 
guidelines and directives that are un-
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der way or have been enacted by the 
European Union (for instance in bio-
technology and chemicals regulation 
or in patent protection). As a result, 
the negotiations dealing with legal and 
regulation aspects have also shifted 
from the national to the European 
governance level – with the European 
Commission and the European Parlia-
ment, the governments and responsi-
ble ministries of the Member states as 
well as the relevant pressure groups of 
the European lobbying process as in-
fluential negotiating parties. However, 
this significant Europeanization of le-
gal activities and regulations has not 
led to a dramatic loss of influence of 
national authorities, actors and con-
troversies up to now. As for instance 
the development of regulations for 
biotechnological research, production 
and marketing or the discussions 
about a renewed European chemicals 
regulation show, national actors and 
interests are closely involved in Euro-
pean negotiations, are often able to set 
the tone, to initiate and to speed up as 
well as to protract or to block the 
European decision-making process 
(Dolata 2003a; Hampel 2005; 
Jacob/Volkery 2005). 
 
Table 1: Budget of the EU Framework Programs for research and technological 
development (FPs) in comparison with the public R&D funds of the Member states 
 
 
 Budget FPs 
(billion Euro) 
Share of FPs on 
total EU budget 
(in %) 
Public R&D 
funds of the 
EU Member 
states (billion 
Euro) 
Share of RP-
budget on pub-
lic R&D funds 
of the Member 
states (in %) 
 
1. FP 
2. FP 
3. FP 
4. FP 
5. FP 
6. FP 
 
1984 – 1987 
1987 – 1990 
1990 – 1994 
1994 – 1998 
1998 – 2002 
2002 - 2006 
 
3.75 
5.37 
6.60 
12.30 
14.96 
17.50 
 
2.41 
3.15 
4.04 
4.02 
4.15 
- 
 
110.5 
128.1 
198.9 
220.1 
251.7 
- 
 
3.4 
4.2 
3.3 
5.6 
5.9 
- 
Source: Rammer et al. 2004: 170 
However, in the field of European 
technology and innovation policy such 
a comprehensive shift is scarcely to be 
identified up to the present – not even 
as an outcome of the recent European 
research area initiative.  
Of course, the European Union has 
become a serious player in technology 
and innovation policy, too. Since the 
early 1980s the EU has established 
ever increasing Framework Programs 
(FPs) for research and technological 
development that are targeted at a 
number of advanced technologies, par-
ticularly including sectoral programs 
to support research in information and 
communication technologies and the 
life sciences. Furthermore, FPs are 
aiming to stimulate scientific coopera-
tion within Europe and to strengthen 
the transnational networking between 
the actors, institutions and regions 
involved (Peterson/Sharp 1998; Borrás 
2003; Prange 2003). 
Even though the total amount of the 
European Union’s spending on re-
search and technological development 
has increased substantially through to 
the present, it cannot keep up with the 
public funds for research and devel-
opment (R&D) in the Member states: 
as table 1 shows, the 17.5 billion Euro 
budget of the latest framework pro-
gram meets with only approximately 
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6% of the total public funds for R&D in 
the Member states, of which about 
75% are spent in Germany, France, the 
UK and Italy (BMBF 2002: 338). The 
European funds have gained in impor-
tance in supporting research and infra-
structures in the smaller and weaker 
Member states, but have only a minor 
impact on the national innovation sys-
tems of the leading ones (Pavitt 1998). 
More important is the fact that Euro-
pean policy has not yet been able to 
integrate the fragmented national re-
search infrastructures, to coordinate 
the various regional, national and 
European policy activities effectively 
and to develop a coherent European 
technology and innovation policy 
which would be mandatory on the 
Member states (Kuhlmann 2001; 
Grande 2001a). In 2000 the European 
Commission itself stressed this nega-
tive record by stating that “it cannot be 
said that there is today a European 
policy on research. National research 
policies and Union policy overlap 
without forming a coherent whole.” 
Furthermore: “Above the European 
research effort as it stands today is no 
more than the simple addition of the 
efforts of the 15 Member States and 
the Union.” (EU-Commission 2000: 7) 
It seems that the European research 
area initiative launched in 2000 will 
not be able to change this situation 
fundamentally. The suggestions made 
with this new approach were not far-
reaching. Although the Commission 
was aware of the lack of coherence 
and coordination of national and 
European technology and innovation 
policies, the only suggestions made in 
this respect were to develop a bench-
marking system of national research 
policies, to improve science and tech-
nology foresight, statistics and indica-
tors, and to strengthen and intensify 
the European networking of existing 
national research centers as well as 
public-private partnerships. In contrast 
to the past, the Commission did not 
claim once again far-reaching new 
competencies in technology policy but 
instead emphasized its role as a cata-
lyst and soft coordinator of activities 
which (should) take place mainly on 
the national and sub-national level 
(EU-Commission 2000, 2002, 2003; see 
also Edler et al. 2003; Edler/Kuhlmann 
2005). This is an remarkable restraint 
which recognizes the persistent domi-
nance of national resources within the 
EU as well as the fact that even though 
the industrial innovation activities are 
highly internationalized, the national 
and sub-national innovation infra-
structures remain the most important 
ones concerning the production of 
new knowledge and technologies.  
To sum up, the future role of the Euro-
pean Union as a player in technology 
and innovation policy seems to be 
confined to the forecasting of techno-
logical developments and the bench-
marking of national policies as well as 
to the stimulation of European net-
working in science and technological 
development. Paradoxically, concen-
trating on this restrained scope of du-
ties may turn out to be a successful 
strategy for further European integra-
tion – not only because it takes into 
account national self-centeredness but 
particularly because it acknowledges 
the necessity of distinct national and 
sub-national policies. Therefore one 
can hardly expect the emergence of a 
European technology and innovation 
policy which could replace or compete 
with the national policies at eye level. 
It seems that the recent initiatives un-
dertaken will not remove the existing 
balance between the European and 
national responsibilities and compe-
tencies in this policy field. 
3.2 National systems of innovation 
and international rivalries 
There are two complementary explana-
tions for this restrained scope of Euro-
pean integration and the persisting 
dominance of national policies in this 
arena. 
Firstly, international as well as re-
gional patterns of innovation are 
chiefly structured and formatively in-
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fluenced by the distinct peculiarities of 
national systems of production, inno-
vation and policy-making. Despite in-
creasing interweaving and penetration 
there is little empirical evidence for a 
strong convergence of national sys-
tems or for the emergence of a coher-
ent European system of innovation. 
Secondly, the leading countries – 
among others especially the U.S., 
Germany, France, the U.K and Japan – 
clearly compete with each other. 
Against the background of a very 
selective and regionally concentrated 
internationalization of industries’ in-
novation activities, national policies 
are forced to compete for technologi-
cal leadership as well as for the most 
excellent and attractive innovation-
oriented infrastructures as major pre-
requisites for their competitive advan-
tage. 
Especially the research on national 
systems of innovation (Nelson 1993; 
Edquist 1997; Mowery/Nelson 1999; 
Balzat/Hanusch 2004) and the varieties 
of capitalism (Soskice 1999; Hollings-
worth 2000; Hage/Hollingsworth 2002) 
has shown convincingly, that major 
differences still exist between national 
systems of production, innovation and 
policy-making. These differences range 
from distinct national research and 
education systems, unique structures 
of industry and inter-firm collabora-
tions through to the financial systems, 
the demand and market structures or 
the patterns of negotiation, public per-
ception and political moderation of 
controversies about new technologies. 
Of course, the national systems are 
closely intertwined in the age of inter-
nationalization and national policies 
try to learn form and adapt to each 
other. But they do so in their own 
unique way and against the back-
ground of very different national inno-
vation cultures, patterns of technologi-
cal specialization, institutional con-
texts and political systems. And they 
try to sharpen unmistakably national 
or rather regional innovation profiles 
and strengths which enable the coun-
try to stand the test of international 
rivalry and competition (Diederen et al. 
1999; Kuhlmann 1999, 2001; Borrás 
2004; Senker/van Zwanenberg 2001). 
All in all there is little evidence so far 
of advanced tendencies towards a uni-
formity of national systems or towards 
the emergence of a coherent European 
system of innovation. Instead, the ter-
ritories of the great nation states re-
main the most relevant areas of inno-
vation with diverse and unique pro-
files. Otherwise the highly selective 
and regionally concentrated locational 
decisions and investments of industry 
would make no sense: enterprises do 
not go anywhere but instead put out 
feelers and make very specific loca-
tional choices. 
Against this background it should be 
comprehensible why core elements of 
technology and innovation policies 
still remain nationally-based – even 
within the European Union. If national 
areas of innovation with distinct infra-
structures, patterns of specialization, 
institutions and cultures are still the 
most important ones, their moderniza-
tion and readjustment right at the 
front has to be pushed forward by na-
tional political authorities. And if the 
internationalization of industrial re-
search, development and innovation 
activities is not viewed as a process of 
locationless globalization but instead 
is identified as a highly selective proc-
ess restricted to a few top regions and 
lead markets worldwide, the great 
Member states of the European Union 
are not only competing with their non-
European rivals (like the U.S. or Japan) 
but also with their European ones – 
and therefore pay careful attention not 
to reduce the remaining leeways of 
national policies by delegating core 
competencies to the European Union 
(Banchoff 2002).1 
                                                       
1 In two interim balance sheets of the 
European Research Area Initiative the EU-
Commission had to admit that „the initia-
tive in its current form seems to be ham-
pered, however, by insufficient participa-
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4 National leeways and profiles:   
Readjustments of technology 
and innovation policy in 
Germany 
If strategies and policies that aim at 
getting competitive advantage are still 
the domain of national initiatives, ne-
gotiations and decisions, the second 
tier of questions concerning the re-
maining leeways and capabilities of 
national technology and innovation 
policies has to be answered. Are the 
competencies and capacities of na-
tional policies being eroded, regarding  
the background of the indisputable 
internationalization of markets, firms 
and technologies? Or do national poli-
cies remain a relevant factor in stimu-
lating and shaping technologies, infra-
structures and institutions? 
4.1 Limits and new challenges of in-
novation policy-making 
The findings so far should have sup-
ported to idea that the capacities of 
innovation policy-making are limited 
to the provision of general conditions 
for strongly self-organized actors and 
private contexts of research, develop-
ment, production and use of new 
technologies. In contrast to this, po-
litical authorities cannot steer or influ-
ence the dynamics of technological 
development itself, of industrial inno-
vation activities or of scientific re-
search in a formative way. Moreover, 
the regionally clustered internationali-
zation of the innovation activities of 
industry has strong repercussions on 
the leeways and the focus of national 
policies: above all they have to develop 
new concepts and instruments which 
aim at providing infrastructural, insti-
tutional and regulatory conditions that 
                                                                 
tion of the Member States. This is reducing 
the impact of the activities being under-
taken, thereby jeopardizing the chances of 
the project achieving its objectives: the 
creation of a genuine ‚Internal market in 
research‘ and the establishment of genuine 
coordination of national research policies.“ 
(EU-Commission 2002: 3; see also EU-
Commission 2003) 
are attractive for both domestic and 
foreign enterprises. 
Therefore, the former alignment of 
national research and technology poli-
cies on the funding of specific technol-
ogy programs, the support of national 
champions and the concentration on 
large technologies (Meyer-
Krahmer/Kuntze 1992) has become too 
limited in several respects. 
The rise of new core technologies such 
as information and communication 
technologies, biotechnology or 
nanotechnologies has qualified the 
importance of large technologies as 
cornerstones of national technological 
competitiveness and as major forces of 
technological change. Accordingly, 
policy is not only forced to readjust the 
portfolio of supported technologies 
but also has to develop new concepts 
and instruments to support this new 
set of core technologies which are de-
veloping in a more decentralized way 
and are being encouraged by numer-
ous private actors and fluid networks 
of innovators (Rammer et al. 2004).  
However, today the attractiveness and 
competitive advantage of a country no 
longer depends mainly on the direct 
public support of new technologies. 
Unmistakable national innovation 
landscapes with competitive regional 
and sectoral technology clusters, ex-
cellent research conditions, effective 
systems of technology transfer and 
future lead markets have become cru-
cial factors for the competitiveness of 
countries as well as for locational de-
cisions and investments of industry 
(Meyer-Krahmer 2005). Accordingly, 
technology and innovation policy ac-
tivities have to open up and to concen-
trate their efforts more strongly on the 
stimulation and restructuring of tech-
nology-related infrastructures and in-
stitutions. 
The former concentration of policies 
on the support and protection of na-
tional champions has also become too 
limited. Against the background of the 
described patterns of internationaliza-
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tion, national policy has also to woo 
foreign enterprises which intend to 
reinforce their own position through 
investments in the host country. 
Moreover, besides the support of large 
enterprises, national policy is forced to 
develop specific initiatives and incen-
tives to support the emergence of tech-
nology-based start-up firms which are 
gaining in importance as locational 
factors. And finally, the strong state-
protection of national champions or 
industries in the past has widely 
proved to be counterproductive in 
stimulating innovations as well as in 
strengthening the national economic 
and technological competitiveness of 
industry. This applies especially to new 
core technologies which are best de-
veloped in the environment of fierce 
competition. “Successful national in-
dustries tend to be ones where in-
tensely competitive domestic rivalries 
push each other to excel.” (Lawton 
1999: 42; see also Monopolkommis-
sion 2004).2 
4.2 New adjustments of national 
technology and innovation policy 
Since the mid 1990s, the governments 
of the leading states have reacted to 
these limits and new challenges with 
remarkable readjustments of their 
technology and innovation policies. 
Despite all variability in the points of 
departure, featured concepts and in-
struments, they aim at strengthening 
unmistakable national and regional 
innovation landscapes by stimulating 
competition as well as networking be-
tween the actors involved and by re-
                                                       
2 Timothy Bresnahan and Franco Malerba 
argue similarly with respect to the protec-
tionist policy of individual European gov-
ernments concerning the computer indus-
try in the 1970s and 1980s: „The effect of 
protection by individual European govern-
ments was to keep an uncompetitive Euro-
pean computer industry alive and sheltered 
from destruction by IBM. These barriers to 
exit, however, did not lead European firms 
to launch major policies and investments 
able to increase their innovativeness and 
competitiveness internationally.“ (1999: 
102) 
structuring the infrastructures and in-
stitutions relevant for innovation 
(Larédo/Mustar 2001; Rammer et al. 
2004). 
In Germany this new set up of priori-
ties in technology and innovation pol-
icy can be observed in particular in 
four related areas.3 
Firstly, the political support of struc-
tural change in the national patterns of 
technological specialization towards 
new research- and knowledge-
intensive technologies and branches of 
industry has been strengthened. How-
ever, the featured initiatives and in-
struments are not new or spectacular. 
They concentrate on the implementa-
tion of research programs which fea-
ture new core technologies, especially 
information and communication tech-
nologies, biotechnology and life sci-
ences, nanotechnologies, new materi-
als and environmental technologies. In 
2004 in Germany 20.1% (in 1993: 
17.1%) of the total (civil and military) 
federal funding on science, research 
and technology was spent to support 
these new clusters of technology. In 
contrast the federal funding of large 
technologies (especially nuclear energy 
and nuclear fusion, aviation and space 
technologies, military projects) has 
gradually decreased (from 29% in 1993 
to 20.1% in 2004), even though these 
sectors are still of importance in the 
profiles of federal support (data calcu-
lated on the basis of BMBF 2004: 616-
621 [table 8a]). 
Secondly, the public support of re-
search, development and innovation in 
industry has changed significantly. In 
general, the federal state has with-
drawn from financing industrial R&D 
                                                       
3 For more detailed empirical findings and 
statistics see the annual reports on the 
technological specialization and competi-
tive advantage of Germany: BMBF 2000a, 
BMBF 2003; BMBF 2004 and Grupp et al. 
2004. A comparative analysis of recent 
trends in technology and innovation policy 
including Germany, the U.S., the U.K., 
France, Japan and Finland can be found in 
Rammer et al. 2004. 
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directly in a remarkable way. While at 
the end of the 1970s the public share 
of total industrial R&D expenses 
amounted to 14%, at the beginning of 
the new millennium in Germany the 
federal state financed not more than 
3.5% of the total R&D-expenses of in-
dustry (Legler et al. 2004: 32f.). More-
over, compared with the public sup-
port of large enterprises, the public 
support and stimulation of small and 
medium sized enterprises, especially of 
new technology-based start-up firms, 
has gained in importance. Although 
even today with approximately 80% 
the bulk of the remaining public sup-
port of industrial R&D falls to large 
enterprises, especially to the aviation 
and space industry, in relative terms 
since the mid 1990s small enterprises 
have benefited more and more from 
public financial support. At present, 
public money amounts to 8.5% of the 
total R&D-expenses of small firms, 
whereas on average only 2.5% of the 
R&D of large enterprises (i.e. compa-
nies with more than 5000 employees) 
is financed by the state (Legler 2004: 
32f.). This is completed by specific 
programs of gaining importance which 
support the founding and financing of 
new start-up firms (BMBF 2002b: 16f.; 
BMBF 2004: 200-2003). All things con-
sidered, innovation policy initiatives 
have realized that small enterprises 
and especially technology-based start-
up firms play an important part as 
catalysts of innovation, as locational 
factors and as potential external re-
sources and partners for big industry. 
Thirdly, since the mid 1990s, national 
policy has begun to take regions as 
important elements of national 
innovation systems seriously and 
therefore has developed new concepts 
and instruments of a region-oriented 
technology and innovation policy 
which makes use of the regional level 
in order to pursue national goals. It 
focuses on three targets: generating 
new regional high-technology clusters, 
stimulating inter-regional competition 
for science, technology and innova-
tion, and improving regional networks 
of innovators as well as the function-
ing of regional innovation systems 
(Braczyk et al. 1998; Dohse 2003, 
2005). In Germany, the successful pro-
totype of this new area of technology 
and innovation policy was the so-
called BioRegio Contest which started 
in the mid 1990s and was as subse-
quent initiatives, too, designed to 
transform a dormant sector into one 
intended to be globally competitive by 
stimulating biotech firm start-ups, the 
growth of existing companies, the pro-
vision of venture capital and the net-
working of regional actors and institu-
tions. The instrument, which was then 
new but is meanwhile widely applied, 
was the invitation to a contest which 
aimed at stimulating new high-
technology clusters and regional cen-
ters of excellence by putting the par-
ticipating regions in an inter-regional 
competition for additional federal 
funding. 
Finally, since the late 1990s political 
measures have been initiated to stimu-
late structural changes of the public 
science and research infrastructures 
and institutions. They aim at a 
stronger competition within the public 
research system and between their 
institutions as well as at a faster rate 
and more efficient system of knowl-
edge and technology transfer from sci-
ence to industry (Etzkowitz 2003). 
Among the public initiatives are the 
introduction of periodical evaluations 
and the hierarchical reorganization of 
universities and other public research 
institutions as well as the intensifica-
tion of competition for financial re-
sources. Moreover, especially the new 
instrument of public competitions is 
widely used to stimulate the clustering 
of first-class research in a few national 
lead projects (so-called "Leitprojekte") 
and centers of excellence (so-called 
"Kompetenzzentren"). Additionally, the 
public support of research projects has 
been strongly focused on applied re-
search and on the intensification of 
collaborations between public re-
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search institutions and enterprises 
(BMBF 2004: V-XVI). As a result the 
pressures on universities and other 
public research institutions to compete 
with each other, to bundle their re-
sources in lead projects and centers of 
excellence, to legitimate scientific re-
search by their economic relevance 
and to contribute to economic devel-
opment have increased significantly 
(Rammer et al. 2004: 132-142). 
4.3 Reflexive stimulation or disjointed 
incrementalism? 
These new adjustments of national 
technology and innovation policy are 
towering above the former concentra-
tion on the political shaping of tech-
nologies and national industries, the 
financing of large technologies and the 
protection of national champions. In-
stead, the renewed approach appears 
to be more indirect and context-
oriented: above all, it aims at restruc-
turing national (and regional) infra-
structures, institutions and innovation 
landscapes which are attractive both 
for scientists and enterprises from 
wherever. The featured new instru-
ments for that purpose are contests 
which stimulate competition between 
research institutions or regions as well 
as initiatives which support the 
clustering of research in national (or 
regional) centers of excellence and the 
networking between scientific and in-
dustrial actors. The addressees of 
these initiatives are no longer mainly 
domestic large enterprises but also 
their foreign counterparts, new start-
up firms and (regional, industrial or 
academic-industrial) networks of in-
novators which often develop only af-
ter the implementation of correspond-
ing public initiatives. 
Within the inevitable limits of innova-
tion policy-making described above, 
the readjusted policy is definitely able 
to cause structural effects. In Germany 
(as well as in other European coun-
tries) it has stimulated the emergence 
of visible sectors of start-up firms 
(Dolata 2003). Moreover, it has forma-
tively contributed to the emergence of 
new regional high-technology clusters 
and the regional networking of actors 
(Dohse 2003). And finally, it has forged 
a far-reaching restructuring of the 
public research and science system 
towards increasing competition and 
clustering, academic-industrial coop-
eration and technology transfer (BMBF 
2004: 473-525). What at first sight ap-
pears as a decline of policy-making 
capacities turns out to be a truly indi-
rect but none the less active and effec-
tive contribution to the readjustment 
of general conditions concerning the 
technology and innovation process. 
Therefore, instead of an erosion we are 
facing a transformation of state 
capacities in technology and inno-
vation policy. 
However, in the end one has to 
roughen up this far too pretty picture 
in at least two respects. 
The new concepts and instruments 
cannot be analyzed as a radical new 
beginning or a clear break with former 
patterns of research and technology 
policy but instead are incrementally 
and sometimes inconsistently fit into 
existing and persisting ones. The per-
sistence of classical patterns of inno-
vation policy-making is blatant espe-
cially in the case of large technologies 
(in Germany for instance this is seen in 
the public support of Transrapid, space 
technologies or traffic telematics) 
which still remain an important focal 
point of technology policy. Johannes 
Weyer has rightly stressed that in these 
cases even today the state operates 
“with the classical repertoire of direct 
intervention, direct project promotion, 
market foreclosure, promotion of 
public champions and the exercise of 
buyers’ and buying power (2004: 293; 
2005)”. 
Moreover, the new adjustments of 
technology and innovation policy can 
cause new problems, that might arise 
as a result thereof. A regional-oriented 
technology policy which aims at pick-
ing winners may foster the develop-
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ment of some selected regions but at 
the same time suppresses the devel-
opment of other regions or innovative 
enterprises that are located outside the 
target region (Dohse 2005). The cur-
rently strong orientations of technol-
ogy and innovation programs and pub-
lic initiatives to restructure the public 
research and science system by inten-
sifying networking between academia 
and industry, stimulating technology 
transfer and the short-term benefits of 
scientific research for economic deve-
lopment, may cause similar problems. 
They tend to underestimate that the 
further development – especially of 
new science-based and knowledge-
intensive technologies – will depend 
exceedingly on the contributions of 
pure basic research for a long period 
(Meyer-Krahmer 2000). Finally, all the 
readjustments of technology and inno-
vation policy so far have hardly made a 
contribution to really integrating and 
institutionalizing the resources and 
actors of public protest and contro-
versy regarding new technologies into 
the patterns of political negotiations 
and decision-making. Of course, poli-
cymakers are strongly dependent on 
external expertise and consultations 
with private actors. However, at the 
top the negotiating state still remains a 
corporatist state. Decisions of general 
importance are usually negotiated with 
large enterprises, the federations of 
industries and the federations of sci-
ence in closed sessions (Saretzki 1997; 
Dolata 2003: 265-303). 
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